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ABSTRACT
The continuing controversy over “527” organizations has led Congress
to impose extensive disclosure requirements on these political organizations
and to consider imposing extensive restrictions on their funding as well.
The debate about what laws should govern these entities has, however, so
far almost completely ignored the fact that such laws raise a complicated
institutional choice question. This Article seeks to resolve that question by
developing a new institutional choice framework to guide this and similar
choices. The Article first explores the context for making this determination
by describing the current laws governing 527s, including both federal
election laws administered by the Federal Election Commission and federal
tax laws administered by the Internal Revenue Service. The Article then
proposes and applies an institutional choice framework to guide the
decision of into which body of substantive law the current and proposed
rules for 527s should be incorporated. The Article concludes that while
regulation of political activity through both election law and tax law can
work reasonably well, the different tasks for which these bodies of law and
their implementing agencies are best suited require a different allocation of
responsibilities than both current and proposed laws governing 527s
provides. Finally, the Article identifies other areas that may benefit from
application of this framework.
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INTRODUCTION
What is a 527? As one commentator succinctly put it, a 527 is a
political advocacy group “named for a tax-code provision.”2 It would be
easy to leave the explanation at that and move on to discuss whether 527s
2

Stuart Taylor Jr., Political Litter: With Many Words but Little Clarity, the Supreme
Court Thrashes Around Over Electoral Fundraising and Redistricting, LEGAL TIMES, July
3, 2006, at 44.
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are truly the blight on democracy as alleged by some3 or the bastions of free
speech and free association as alleged by others.4 But doing so skips over a
series of intriguing and important questions. What does tax law have to do
with political activity – isn’t that what election law is for? And, given the
existence of election law and the Federal Election Commission, how do we
determine what role if any the tax law and the Internal Revenue Service
should play with respect to political activity? Can these two bodies of law
and their administering agencies both regulate political activity? Or will
having them both do so undermine the goals of such regulation?
These questions are far from theoretical. After almost a century of
election law and tax law operating separately in the political sphere,
Congress breached that separation in 2000 by imposing an extensive
disclosure regime on 527s that mimics the disclosure regime for electionlaw regulated political committees but is administered by the Internal
Revenue Service.5 When this disclosure regime revealed that in 2004
almost half-a-billion dollars flowed through 527s, including such infamous
ones as Swift Boat Veterans and POWs for Truth and America Coming
Together,6 Congress began considering legislative proposals to extend to
most 527s the election law restrictions on the sources and amounts of
contributions that apply to political committees.7 Yet during the passage of
the 527 disclosure rules, and now the ongoing consideration of 527
contribution restrictions, there has been essentially no discussion regarding
the fundamental differences between election law and tax law and how
those differences should inform the debate over regulating the much
maligned 527.
This Article explores this choice between election law and tax law by
developing a new theoretical framework to judge whether pursuit of a
particular policy goal is best done through one body of substantive law or
another. Part I explains the context for making this determination by
describing the current election law and tax law rules governing political
activity. Part II develops a new institutional choice framework for making
3

See, e.g., Glen Justice, The 2004 Campaign: Campaign Financing: G.O.P. Group
Says Its Ready to Wage Ad War, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2004, at A4 (quoting President Bush
as saying “I don’t think we ought to have 527’s” and “they’re bad for the system.”).
4
See, e.g., Stephen Moore, Issue Ads: Let ‘Em Rip, WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 2004, at
A25 (the executive director of a 527, Club for Growth, defending political ads by outside
groups, including 527s, as “fulfill[ing] an important role in our democratic system” by
preventing candidates and political parties from monopolizing communications during the
campaign season).
5
See infra Part I.C. For the definition of a “political committee,” see infra notes 26-27
and accompanying text.
6
See infra note 96 and accompanying text.
7
See infra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
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this decision, detailing the relevant characteristics of the legislative
processes, administering agencies, and effectiveness of administration under
two bodies of substantive law that may reveal crucial differences between
the two. Part III applies this framework to the current and proposed
intersection of election and tax laws, which targets 527s. Part IV suggests
several ways that election law and tax law should – and should not – be
changed to reflect the insights provided by this approach. My conclusion is
that while regulation of political activity through both election law and tax
law can work and work reasonably well, the different tasks for which these
bodies of law and their implementing agencies are best suited require a
different allocation of responsibilities than both current and proposed law
provides. Finally, I identify other areas that may benefit from application of
this new institutional choice framework.
A brief word on what this Article is not about. It is not an attempt to
explore the significant constitutional issues raised by regulating 527s, a
topic that has been addressed by others at length;8 rather, I assume that at
least some level of regulation is constitutionally permitted. This Article is
also not an attempt to explore the wisdom of the general tax rule that
expenditures for political activities are not deductible. That issue has not
been raised in the current debates and, despite some recent scholarship
suggesting that the tax treatment of such expenditures should be revisited,9
it appears unlikely to be an issue in the foreseeable future. Finally, this
Article focuses solely on federal laws, although it is important to note that
8

See, e.g., Richard Briffault., The 527 Problem . . . and the Buckley Problem, 73 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 949 (2005); Elizabeth Kingsley & John Pomeranz, “A Crash at the
Crossroads: Tax and Campaign Finance Laws Collide in Regulation of Political Activities
of Tax-Exempt Organizations,” 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 55, 103-18 (2004); Gregg D.
Polsky & Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Regulating Section 527 Organizations, 73 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1000, 1027-34 (2005); Adriana Riviere, Comment, 527s: The New Frontier for
Election Law, 60 U. MIAMI L. REV. 261 (2006).
9
For example, several commentators have proposed reintroducing a federal tax credit
for political contributions as one mechanism to increase citizen involvement in political
campaigns and/or reduce the influence of special interests. Debra Burke, Twenty Years
After the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974: Look Who’s Running Now,
99 DICK. L. REV. 357, 384-85 (1995); Thomas Cmar, Special Series on Election Law:
Toward a Small Donor Democracy: The Past and Future of Incentive Programs for Small
Political Contributions, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 443 (2005); John M. de Figueredo &
Elizabeth Garrett, Paying for Politics, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 591 (2005); Spencer Overton,
The Donor Class: Campaign Finance, Democracy, and Participation, 153 U. PA. L. REV.
73, 107-118 (2004); David Rosenberg, Broadening the Base: The Case for a New Federal
Tax Credit for Political Contributions (2002). The previous credit existed from 1971 to
1986. See note 52 infra. Another commentator has proposed using the tax laws to limit
political contributions by replacing campaign contribution ceilings with graduated
campaign contribution taxes. David S. Gamage, Note, Taxing Political Donations: The
Case for Corrective Taxes in Campaign Finance, 113 YALE L.J. 1283 (2004).
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federal laws can have a significant effect on entities and individuals seeking
to influence and participate in state and local elections and also may lead to
the enactment of similar state laws.10
I. CURRENT & PROPOSED LAW
The current attempts to control 527s occur within a larger framework of
rules governing political activity, which is embodied in both election law
and tax law provisions. Until recently, these two bodies of law operated
almost completely independently of each other and so it is useful to
describe each in isolation before exploring how they now overlap and how
pending proposals would increase that overlap. This separate operation
arose from the fact that election law has historically sought to control the
funding of a narrow range of election-related activities in order to prevent
corruption and the appearance of corruption, resulting in a fundamental
tension with the constitutionally protected freedoms of speech and
association. Tax law, in contrast, has historically only sought to determine
the proper tax treatment of funds used for broad range of election activities
without imposing any absolute prohibitions, allowing it to avoid, for the
most part, constitutional conflicts.
A. Election Law
Election law for purposes of this Article means non-tax laws relating to
the disclosure of and restrictions on contributions and expenditures for
political activity.11 These laws are found in the Federal Election Campaign
Act of 1971, as amended (“FECA”).12 Both the restriction and disclosure
provisions arose because of Congress’ concern with corruption and the
appearance of corruption in elections.13 Advocates of such rules also
10

Or legislative proposals may successfully become law at the state level while
Congress is still considering them at the federal level. See infra note 97 (stating that West
Virginia has already enacted a law imposing contribution limits on 527s).
11
Other areas of election law include rules relating to eligibility to vote, eligibility to
run for office, redistricting, ballot initiatives, and administration of elections. See generally
SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY (2d ed. 2002); DANIEL HAYS
LOWENSTEIN & RICHARD L. HASEN, ELECTION LAW (3d ed. 2004). At least one
commentator has questioned whether “election law” can be so easily defined, however, a
point that is supported by the fact that tax law also regulates election-related activities as
detailed in this Article. See John Copeland Nagle, The Appearance of Election Law, 31 J.
LEGIS. 37 (2004).
12
FECA is codified primarily at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455 (2000 & Supp. III 2003).
13
See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 115-117 (2003) (detailing the corruption
concerns that underlay Congress’ enactment of federal election laws); Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 27 (1976) (citing Congress’ concern with “the impact of the appearance of
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sought to reduce the influence of the wealthy over the electoral process,14
although the Supreme Court has found this reason insufficient to justify the
impact of these rules on freedom of speech and freedom of association.15 In
addition, Congress enacted the disclosure provisions to provide the
electorate with information about candidates and their supporters and to
gather information to detect violations of the restrictions.16
The constitutional protections for freedom of speech and freedom of
association, and the related issue of encouraging participation by permitting
anonymous involvement in the political process, are a counterweight to
these goals, however.17 Several members of the Supreme Court have also
indicated that restrictions on political activity may have to be limited if
there is sufficient evidence the restrictions reduce competitiveness in
elections.18 The need to strike a balance between these various concerns
has led, among other results, to different rules for candidates, political
parties, and other political committees19 on one hand, and persons acting
corruption stemming from public awareness of the opportunities for abuse inherent in a
regime of large individual financial contributions”).
14
See ROBERT E. MUTCH, CAMPAIGNS, CONGRESS, AND COURTS: THE MAKING OF
FEDERAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW 54-66 (1988) (detailing the development of arguments
in support of and in opposition to contribution limits, including ones based on the allegedly
improper undue influence of the wealthy).
15
E.g., Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49. Recently, however, several Supreme Court
Justices have indicated a willingness to reconsider that conclusion. Richard L. Hasen,
Buckley is Dead, Long Live Buckley: The New Campaign Finance Incoherence of
McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 31 (2004); see also
Briffault, supra note 8, at 995-99 (arguing that political equality may provide a sufficient
governmental interest to support additional restrictions on 527s).
16
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66-68.
17
See id. at 14-15, 68. For example, the First Amendment’s freedom of speech clause
bars laws that prohibit the distribution of all anonymous documents that seek to influence
voters in an election. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 353-56 (1995)
(distinguishing Buckley v. Valeo). But see Major v. Abell, 361 F.3d 349 (7th Cir. 2004)
(finding constitutional an Indiana statute that required political advertising expressly
advocating the election or defeat of an identified candidate to include a disclaimer
identifying the persons who paid for the advertising; distinguishing McIntyre).
18
Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479, 2495 (2006) (Breyer, J. (plurality)); see also
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 30-35 (1976) (in the context of a broad challenge to FECA’s
provisions, as amended in 1974, rejecting a challenge to FECA’s contribution limits based
on the argument that they discriminated between incumbents and challengers, in part
because there was no evidence that this was in fact their effect). Ensuring competiveness
in elections might also be a sufficient governmental interest to support the constitutionality
of certain restrictions if there is sufficient evidence that the restrictions would promote such
competiveness. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, The Return of Spending Limits: Campaign
Finance After Landell v. Sorrell, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 399, 433-35 (2005) (arguing that
there ensuring competitive elections may be sufficient grounds to support reasonable
spending limits).
19
For the definition of a political committee, see infra notes 26-27 and accompanying
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independently of such entities, on the other hand.
1. Rules for Candidates, Political Parties, and Other Political Committees
Currently, election laws restrict the sources and the amounts of
contributions to candidates,20 political parties, and other political
committees (defined below) and requires disclosure of contributions
received and expenditures made. Congress also attempted to restrict the
amount of expenditures by candidates and political parties, but in the
landmark decision of Buckley v. Valeo in which the Supreme Court
considered the constitutionality of FECA’s major provisions, the Court
found such limits to be unconstitutional.21
Restrictions. The restrictions on sources of contributions include longstanding prohibitions of corporate and union contributions to candidates.22
Prior to the enactment of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002
(“BCRA”),23 such entities could make contributions to political parties, but
the 2002 law barred such “soft money” contributions to national political
parties and ended the ability of state and local political party committees to
use such contributions for most activities related to federal elections.24
These prohibitions also extend to political committees other than candidate
campaign committees and political party committees; such other political
committees are commonly referred to as “political action committees” or
“PACs.”25 The definition of a political committee, as interpreted by the
Supreme Court in Buckley, is an organization that is either under the control
of a candidate or has a “major purpose” to nominate or elect a candidate and
text.
20

For purposes of this Article, the term “candidates” includes candidate campaign
committees.
21
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 58-59; see also Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2490-91 (Breyer, J.,
plurality) (joined by Roberts, C.J.) (reaffirming this position), 2501 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (same), 2501-02 (Thomas, J., concurring) (joined by Scalia, J.)) (same).
22
2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (2000). Congress enacted the ban on corporate contributions in
1907 (Pub. L. No. 59-36, 34 Stat. 864 (1907)) and the ban on union contributions in 1943
(War Labor Disputes Act, ch. 144, § 9, 57 Stat. 163, 167 (1943)). Similar prohibitions also
now exist for government contractors, 2 U.S.C. § 441c(a)(1) (2000), and foreign nationals
who are not permanent residents, id. § 441e.
23
Pub. L. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002) (“BCRA”) (codified at scattered sections of 2
U.S.C.). With only a few minor exceptions not relevant here, the Supreme Court found
BCRA’s provisions to be constitutional. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
24
BCRA § 101, 116 Stat. at 82-86 (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431, 441i (2000 & Sup.. III
2003)). Soft money is money that is not subject to FECA’s limitations on the sources and
amounts of contributions and so contrasts with hard money that is subject to those
limitations and so is harder to raise. See ANTHONY CORRADO ET AL., THE NEW CAMPAIGN
FINANCE SOURCEBOOK 29 (2005).
25
See CORRADO , supra note 24, at 18 (describing the origin of the “PAC” label).
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which either receives $1,000 in contributions or makes $1,000 in
expenditures during a single calendar year.26 This definition is less broad
than it first appears because the Federal Election Commission (the “FEC”),
in the wake of Buckley, interpreted “expenditures” in this context as being
limited to expenditures for campaign contributions and express advocacy
and applied this limited definition both to the major purpose test (i.e.,
making that test whether the major purpose of the committee to make
campaign contributions and/or engage in express advocacy) and the $1,000
threshold.27
The restrictions on contribution amounts means that even persons who
are allowed to make contributions to candidates, political parties, and other
political committees – i.e., individuals who are U.S. citizens or permanent
residents, political party committees, and PACs – can only contribute a
limited amount to each candidate or organization. Many of the limits are
subject to adjustment for inflation, but for individuals during the 2005-2006
election cycle the limit was $2,100 per candidate per election, higher annual
amounts for contributions to political party committees and PACs, and
$101,400 overall for all contributions during the election cycle.28 Similar
limits apply to contributions by political parties and PACs to candidates and
each other, although there are no limits on transfers among political party
committees and only national party committees have an aggregate limit and
then only with respect to Senate candidates.29
The overall effect of these restrictions on sources and amounts is to
make it harder for candidates, political parties, and other political
committees involved in elections to raise large amounts – hence the term
“hard money” for funds subject to these limits. Despite that term, political
parties have shown a remarkable ability to raise such funds: in 2004 the
national party committees raised over $1.2 billion in hard money as
compared with the slightly less than $1.1 billion in both hard and soft
26

2 U.S.C. § 431(4) (2000); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 79.
See Briffault, supra note 8, at 957-58 (describing the FEC’s adoption of this
position). Both a careful reading of Buckley, see Polsky & Charles, supra note 8, at note
36 and accompanying text, and the McConnell decision, in which the Supreme Court
upheld as constitutional restrictions on funding sources for certain communications that did
not contain express advocacy, raise questions about the FEC’s interpretation, but the FEC
has maintained this interpretation. See Briffault, supra note 8, at 970-72 (describing FEC’s
ultimate rejection of a broader definition for political committee).
28
See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1), (3) (2000 & Supp. III 2003) (providing the unadjusted by
inflation limits for contributions by individuals); 70 FED. REG. 11658, 11659-60 (Mar. 9,
2005) (providing the inflation adjusted limits for the 2005-06 election cycle).
29
See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1), (2), (4) (2000 & Supp. III 2003) (listing the unadjusted
by inflation limits for contributions by entities other than individuals); 70 FED. REG. 11658,
11659-60 (Mar. 9, 2005) (listing the inflation adjusted limits for the 2005-06 election cycle,
for those limits that are adjusted for inflation).
27
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money they raised during 2000, the last presidential election year during
which the parties could raise soft money.30
Disclosure. With respect to disclosure, current law requires candidates,
political parties, and other political committees to provide detailed and
frequent public filings identifying contributors who give more than $200
and recipients of expenditures who receive more than $200.31 The Federal
Election Committee makes these filings available to the public on the
Internet through a searchable database.32 Individual contributors are
identified not only by name but also by address and employer, thereby
making it relatively easy both to verify compliance with the above
restrictions and for the public to identify the supporters of a particular
candidate, party, or other political committee.33
2. Rules for Independent Actors
Individuals and groups acting independently of candidates and political
party committees and that are not political committees under the FEC’s
narrow definition face a less extensive set of restrictions and disclosure
requirements. First and most importantly, such persons are affected by
election law only if they make “independent expenditures” or
“electioneering communications.”
In Buckley, the Supreme Court narrowly defined independent
expenditures as expenditures for communications “that in express terms
advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate.”34 In doing
so, the Court listed what became known as the “magic words” that meet this
“express advocacy” requirement.35 While the FEC has consistently sought
to include within the reach of the election laws any communication that
“taken as a whole and with limited reference to external events . . . could
only be interpreted by a reasonable person as containing advocacy of the
election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate,”36 not just
30

THE ELECTION AFTER REFORM 26 (Michael J. Malbin, ed. 2006).
2 U.S.C. § 434(a)(4), (b)(3)(A), (5)(A) (2000 & Supp. III 2003).
32
The database is accessible at http://www.fec.gov/disclosure.shtml.
33
See, e.g., www.fundrace.org (allows searches for contributors by zip code, allowing
visitors to identify their neighbors who have made reported contributions to federal
candidates, political parties, or other political committees; operated by the charity Eyebeam
R&D).
34
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 (quoted language), 79-80 (applying the quoted
language to the definition of an “expenditure” for purposes of individuals and groups other
than candidates and political committees) (1976).
35
Id. at 44, n.52 (words “such as ‘vote for,’ ‘elect,’ ‘support,’ ‘cast your ballot for,’
‘Smith for Congress,’ ‘vote against,’ ‘defeat,’ ‘reject’”).
36
11 C.F.R. § 100.22(b).
31
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communications containing the Buckley magic words, the courts have
almost uniformly rejected this effort.37
In response to the ease with which a communication could be designed
to avoid express advocacy classification while still clearly seeking to
influence the election of a candidate,38 Congress in 2002 created a new
category of communications that are now subject to restrictions and
disclosure:
“electioneering
communications.”39
Electioneering
communications are broadcast, cable, or satellite communications which
refer to a clearly identified candidate within a short period before a primary
or general election (or nominating convention or caucus) and reach the
relevant electorate.40 Other activities that are done independently of
candidates and political parties by individuals or groups other than political
committees continue to be free from any restrictions or disclosure
requirements under election law.41
Restrictions.
Both independent expenditures and electioneering
communications may not be paid for by corporations or labor unions.42
There is, however, an exception for so-called “Massachusetts Citizens for
Life” or “MCFL” corporations. These corporations are named after the
37

See, e.g., Virginia Society for Human Life, Inc. v. FEC, 263 F.3d 379, 390-92 (4th
Cir. 2001); Maine Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. FEC, 98 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1996); see also
Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America v. Moore, 288 F.3d 187, 193-96
(5th Cir. 2002) (citing cases striking down both this regulation and similar state provisions
as unconstitutional). But see FEC v. Furgatch, 807 F.2d 857, 861-64 (9th Cir. 1987)
(upholding the broader definition of express advocacy, which the FEC then incorporated
into the cited regulation).
38
See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45 (recognizing the ease of creating such an
advertisement). The following October 1996 advertisement about Bill Yellowtail, then a
Democratic candidate for Congress in Montana, and paid for by Citizens for Reform, an
independent organization not registered as a political committee, is illustrative of this
concern:
Who is Bill Yellowtail? He preaches family values but took a swing at his
wife. And Yellowtail’s explanation? He only slapped her but her nose was not
broken. He talks law and order but is himself a convicted criminal. And though
he talks about protecting children, Yellowtail failed to make his own child support
payments and then voted against child support enforcement. Call Bill Yellowtail
and tell him we don’t approve of his wrongful behavior.
Transcript, Washington Week with Gwen Ifill & National Journal (PBS television
broadcast Nov. 7, 1997). Bill Yellowtail lost the election. Ibid.
39
BCRA §§ 201-204 (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 434, 441a, 441b (2000 & Supp. III
2003).
40
2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(i) (2000 & Supp. III 2003).
41
To be independent, expenditures must not be “coordinated” with candidates or
political parties. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(7)(B) (2000) (treating expenditures that are
coordinated with a candidate as contributions to the candidate’s campaign and so subject to
FECA’s limits on such contributions).
42
2 U.S.C. § 441b(a), (b)(2), (c) (2000 & Supp. III 2003)).
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Supreme Court case that created the exception, FEC v. Massachusetts
Citizens for Life,43 in which the Court held that the election law prohibition
on corporate funding of independent express advocacy was unconstitutional
as applied to organizations that had three characteristics: formed to promote
political ideas and not to engage in business activities; having no
shareholders or other persons with a claim to the organization’s assets or
earnings; and not established by a business corporation or labor union and
not accepting contributions from such organizations.44
The FEC
subsequently issued regulations embodying its interpretation of this
decision.45 The Supreme Court has also extended this exception to
electioneering communications.46
There are, however, no limits on the amount of contributions that may
be received from eligible contributors – i.e., individuals who are U.S.
citizens and permanent residents and Massachusetts Citizens for Life
entities47 – to pay for independent expenditures or electioneering
communications. Thus even with respect to the relatively narrow set of
activities covered by election law, independent actors have a significant
fundraising advantage. There are also no limits on expenditures, as the
Supreme Court struck down such limits as unconstitutional at the same time
that it struck down limits on expenditures by candidates and political
parties.48
Disclosure. Current law also requires other persons who make either
independent expenditures or electioneering communications to file detailed
reports relating to those activities. For independent expenditures, these
reports require the same level of detail with respect to contributions
received and expenditures made as the reports for political committees and
must be filed promptly after the spender reaches certain expenditure
43

479 U.S. 238 (1986).
Id. at 263-64.
45
60 FED. REG. 35292 (July 6, 1995) (among other provisions, adding 11 C.F.R. §
114.10 (“Nonprofit corporations exempt from the prohibition on independent
expenditures”)).
46
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 210-11 (2003). The 2002 electioneering
communications provisions actually contain a Massachusetts Citizens for Life-type
exception, codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441b(c)(2) (2000 & Supp. III 2003), but in an example of
the convoluted history of those provisions that exception is completely eliminated by
another provision, codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441b(c)(6) (2000 & Supp. III 2003).
47
In theory PACs could also be contributors, but given that PACs can only raise hard
money it would make little sense for a PAC to use its limited hard money to support an
expenditure that was not subject to the hard money contribution limits. Contributions by
candidates or political parties would raise coordination, and therefore lack of
independence, concerns. See note 41 supra (describing the treatment of coordinated
expenditures).
48
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 51 (1976).
44
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thresholds.49 For electioneering communications, these reports require
detailed information regarding expenditures of more than $200 but
information regarding contributors is only required if a donor’s aggregate
contributions are $1,000 or more.50 The person making electioneering
communications must also file such reports promptly after he, she or it
reaches a $10,000 expenditure threshold.51
Individuals and organizations other than political committees acting
independently of candidates and political parties therefore have similar
disclosure requirements and limits on sources of funds as candidates,
political parties, and other political committees. Such individual actors are
not, however, subject to any limits on the amounts given by permitted
contributors, in contrast to candidates, political parties, and other political
committees.
B. Tax Law
The heart of the tax law provisions addressing political activity is the
long-standing rule that no tax deduction is allowed for expenditures for
political activity, which is generally defined as activity that supports or
opposes a candidate for elected public office.52 To prevent avoidance of
this rule, Congress has also prohibited charities that are eligible to receive
tax deductible contributions from engaging in activities that support or
oppose candidates53 and required trade associations and similar entities to
49

2 U.S.C. § 434(c), (g) (requiring reports from persons making independent
expenditures of $10,000 or more ($1,000 or more if 20 days or less before an election)
within 48 hours (24 hours if 20 days or less before an election) of the expenditures) (2000
& Supp. III 2003).
50
Id. § 434(f)(2).
51
Id. § 434(f)(1) (requiring reports within 24 hours of reaching the threshold).
52
See 26 U.S.C. § 162(e) (2000). The Treasury Department issued the first version of
this rule in 1915. SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, TREASURY DECISIONS UNDER INTERNALREVENUE LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, vol. 17, at 48, 57-58 (1915). The only exception
to this rule was when Congress chose to provide a small credit and a small deduction for
political contributions in order to encourage political participation in the 1970s and 1980s.
See Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. 92-178, §§ 701-702, 85 Stat. 497, 560-62 (repealed in
1978 (deduction) and 1986 (credit)).
53
See 26 U.S.C. §§ 170(c)(2)(D), 501(c)(3) (2000). Even before Congress codified the
prohibition in 1954, political activities were thought to be inconsistent with charitable
status. See 9 JACOB MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 34.05, at 22 (rev.
vol. 1983) (stating that the 1954 codification “merely expressly stated what had always
been understood to be the law. Political campaigns did not fit within any of the specified
purposes listed in the section.”); Slee v. Commissioner, 42 F.2d 184, 185 (2d Cir. 1930) (in
the context of upholding the denial of deductible contributions under the predecessor to
Code section 501(c)(3) because of lobbying efforts, stating that “[s]o far, however, as [the
recipient organization]’s political activities were general, it seems to us . . . that its
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either pay tax on dues paid to them to the extent the dues are used for
political activities or to notify the dues-payers and other contributors that
the portion of their payments used for such activities are not deductible as a
business expense.54
The reasons for this no deduction rule are unclear. Several respected
commentators have suggested that the rule’s origins lie in the same
concerns about corruption and political equality that motivated election
law.55 The lack of any administrative or legislative history for this rule
makes it impossible to confirm whether this was in fact the case, however.56
A possible alternate explanation is that Congress simply viewed political
activities as not being a trade or business and so as not being an appropriate
subject for a business expense deduction or any other existing deduction.57
But regardless of the reasons for its adoption, the rule still left two
issues unsettled. First, what should be the tax treatment of organizations
primarily engaged in political activity? And second, what exactly
purposes cannot be said to be ‘exclusively’ charitable, educational or scientific” as then
(and now) required for a contribution to be deductible).
54
See 26 U.S.C. §§ 162(e)(3), 6033(e) (2000) (also covering non-deductible lobbying
expenditures).
55
See, e.g., 1 BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF
INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS, ¶ 20.3.7, at 20-58 (2d ed. 1981) (citing court cases upholding
the rule which referenced the potentially negative role of money in politics); William D.
Andrews, “Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax,” 86 HARV. L. REV. 309, 364
(1972) (without citation, stating that the reason for limiting the deductibility of political
contributions is “[w]e fear oppression if wealthy people are able to dominate the political
process”); Eric M. Zolt, Deterrence Via Taxation: A Critical Analysis of Tax Penalty
Provisions, 37 UCLA L. REV. 343, 353-54 (1989) (including the denial of deductions for
business political campaign expenditures and certain worthless debts owed by political
parties in a list of tax provisions Congress haws enacted to increase the costs of undesirable
activities); see also Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467, 473 (1943) (suggesting in
dicta the denial of deductibility is rooted in sharply defined (but unstated) national
policies); R.T. Boehm, Taxes and Politics, 22 TAX L. REV. 369, 412 (1967) (arguing that
the initial ruling denying a deduction for political expenditures arose from a general
attempt to control, i.e., limit, the involvement of corporations in politics).
56
Neither the pre-1962 administrative pronouncements nor the codification in 1962
provide any explanation for continuing the non-deductibility rule. See, e.g., supra note 52;
T.D. 2690, Art. 143 (1918), reprinted in INTERNAL REVENUE ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES,
1909-1950: LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES, LAWS, AND ADMINISTRATIVE DOCUMENTS (Bernard
D. Reams, Jr., ed.), vol. 132, at 75 (1979); I.T. 3276, 1939-1 C.B. 108; H.R. REP. NO. 872518, 420-22 (1962) (describing the reasons for permitting the deduction for some
lobbying expenses and then noting, without explanation, that there is no intent to permit the
deduction of political campaign expenditures); S. REP. NO. 87-1881, 727-30 (1962) (same).
57
See S. REP. NO. 93-1357, 26 (1974) (in the context of adding Code section 527,
stating that political activity is not a trade or business); H.R. REP. NO. 93-1502, 104 (1974)
(same). Tax deductions are generally only available if specifically provided by Congress.
Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 693 (1966); Biazar v. Commissioner, T.C.M. (RIA)
2004-270, at 3.
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constitutes political activity?
1. The Origin of 527s
Trying to address the first question, the Treasury Department initially
wrestled with the extent to which organizations that otherwise qualified for
tax-exempt but not charitable status – and so to which contributions are not
deductible as charitable contributions – could engage in political activity.
Examples of such organizations are “social welfare” organizations that are
tax-exempt under section 501(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code (the
“Code”), such as the Sierra Club and the National Rifle Association, labor
organizations that are tax-exempt under Code section 501(c)(5), such as the
AFL-CIO, and chambers of commerce and trade associations that are taxexempt under Code section 501(c)(6), such as the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce and the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers. The Treasury
Department ultimately concluded, after some flip-flopping, that such
organizations would be tax-exempt as long as their primary activity
furthered the social welfare, labor, or business purpose that justified their
tax-exempt status but that political activity could not count toward this
primary activity requirement.58 In other words, political activity had be no
more than a secondary activity of such entities if they wished to remain taxexempt.59 A corollary to this rule was therefore that organizations engaged
primarily in political activity were taxable.60
This conclusion did not fully resolve the tax situation of organizations
engaged primarily in political activity, however, because there still
remained the question of whether contributions to such organizations –
presumably the vast majority of their income – should be included in their
taxable income. The Internal Revenue Service (the “IRS”) initially took the
58

See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,233 (Dec. 3, 1969) (reviewing the shifting
positions of the IRS and the IRS Chief Counsel’s office before ultimately reaching this
conclusion); T.D. 6391, 1959-2 C.B. 139, 145 (with only the explanation that comments
had been considered, reaching this conclusion with respect to Code section 501(c)(4) social
welfare organizations). The IRS recently confirmed in an internal publication that this
remains its position. John Francis Reilly & Barbara A. Braig Allen, Political Campaign
and Lobbying Activities of IRC 501(c)(4), (c)(5), and (c)(6) Organizations, EXEMPT
ORGANIZATIONS TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR FY2003, at L-1, L-2 to L-3.
59
Exactly how to determine what is an organization’s “primary” activity remains
unclear. See, e.g., ABA Members Comment on Exempt Organizations and Politics, 45
EXEMPT ORG. TAX. REV. 136, 152-54 (2004) (describing the uncertain definition of
“primary” in this context and proposing the creation of a bright-line safe harbor).
60
See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 33,495 (Apr. 27, 1967) (“[t]he [Internal Revenue]
Service has maintained the position that a political party does not qualify for an exemption
from tax under section 501(c)(4), or indeed that it is specifically exempted from taxation
under any other section of the Code”).
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position that while such organizations were not exempt from tax, such
contributions were excluded from their taxable income as “gifts.”61 But the
government created some uncertainty on this point when it attempted to tax
the Communist Party.62 So to finally resolve this issue, Congress enacted
the now infamous Code section 527.63
Section 527 resolved the tax exemption issue by providing tax
exemption for organizations primarily engaged in political activity, but only
with respect to contributions received by such organizations which are set
aside for political activity.64 Other contributions and income from other
sources are still taxable.65 Section 527 also subjects to tax – at the highest
corporate tax rate – the net investment income of other types of otherwise
tax-exempt organizations to the extent of the lesser of those organizations
political activity expenditures or amount of net investment income.66
The effect of Code section 527 was therefore to clarify the tax status of
organizations engaged primarily in political activity. At the same time, it
ensured that neither those organizations nor other tax-exempt organizations
permitted to engage in political activity as a non-primary activity –
primarily social welfare organizations, labor organizations, and trade
associations – could use their tax-exempt status to generate income that
escaped taxation and was then used for political activity. By placing 527s
and other tax-exempt organizations on the same tax footing, Congress
hoped to encourage those other organizations to create 527s for their
political activities “to the benefit both of the organization and the
administration of the tax laws.”67 Combined with the rule that contributions
to either section 527 organizations or other types of non-charitable taxexempt organizations that engage in political activity are not tax deductible,
this rule effectively requires all taxpayers to use after-tax dollars for
political activity.68
61

I.T. 3276, 1939-1 (part 1) C.B. 108.
See Communist Party of U.S.A. v. Commissioner, 373 F.2d 682, 684 & n.2 (D.C.
Cir. 1967) (noting that despite the government’s attempt to limit its assertion that the
taxpayer had received taxable dues instead of non-taxable contributions to the Communist
Party and so not applicable to political parties generally, the distinction between dues and
contributions would now be of interest to all political parties).
63
Pub. L. 93-625, § 10, 88 Stat. 2108, 2116-19 (1975) (codified as amended at 26
U.S.C. 527 (2000 & Supp. III 2003)).
64
26 U.S.C. § 527(a), (c)(1)(A), (3), (e)(1), (2) (2000).
65
26 U.S.C. § 527(b), (c)(1) (2000).
66
26 U.S.C. § 527(f) (2000).
67
S. REP. NO. 93-1357, 30 (1974); see also H.R. REP. NO. 93-1502, 108 (1974) (same).
68
See supra notes 52 & 54 and accompanying text. The Code section 527 legislation
also taxed contributors on any built-in gain if they contributed appreciated property to a
527, thereby prevent such gain from avoiding taxation. Pub. L. 93-625, § 13, 88 Stat.
2108, 2120-21 (1975) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 84 (2000)). There are some gaps in the
62
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One major loose end still exists with respect to the tax treatment of
contributions for political activities, however. Simultaneously with the
enactment of section 527, Congress also clarified that donations to 527s
would not be subject to gift tax (which arguably would have otherwise
applied to contributions from individuals).69
Congress left unclear,
however, whether donations to other non-charitable tax-exempt
organizations are subject to gift tax, whether the contributions are for
political activities or not. The IRS’ position is that the gift tax does apply to
such contributions,70 but there are reasons to believe that this position is
both legally unsound71 and not generally complied with or enforced in
practice.72
2. The Tax Definition of Political Activity
While Code section 527 resolved the tax status of organizations engaged
primarily in political activity, it did not completely resolve how broadly
political activity should be defined for purposes of either section 527 or the
other Code sections and regulations addressing political activity. That task
was left primarily to the IRS.
The various tax provisions discussing political activity use varying
language.73 In practice, however, the IRS has repeatedly indicated that the
coverage of this rule, although none appear to be major. These gaps include the fact that
non-charitable tax-exempt organizations can earn income that is not subject to tax under 26
U.S.C. § 527(f) from trades or businesses that are substantially related to those
organizations’ primary purposes and then use those funds for political activity and the fact
that veterans organizations are eligible to receive tax-deductible contributions under 26
U.S.C. § 170(a), (c)(3) but are not subject to any tax law restrictions on their political
activities.
69
Pub. L. 93-625, § 14, 88 Stat. 2108, 2121 (1975) (amending 26 U.S.C. § 2501(a)
(2000)).
70
Rev. Rul. 82-216, 1982-2 C.B. 220 (stating that “gratuitous transfers to persons
other than [527s] are subject to the gift tax absent any specific statute to the contrary, even
though the transfers may be motivated by a desire to advance the donor's own social,
political or charitable goals”).
71
See Barbara Rhomberg, Constitutional Issues Cloud the Gift Taxation of Section
501(c)(4) Contributions, 15 TAXATION OF EXEMPTS 176 (Jan./Feb. 2004); Barbara
Rhomberg, The Law Remains Unsettled on Gift Taxation of Section 501(c)(4)
Contributions, 15 TAXATION OF EXEMPTS 62 (Sept./Oct. 2003).
72
ABA Members Comment, supra note 59, at 142-43 (noting the apparent lack of
knowledge about, and government enforcement of, the gift tax on contributions to section
501(c)(4) organizations).
73
See 26 U.S.C. § 162(e)(1)(B) (2000) (“participation in, or intervention in, any
political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office”); 26
U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000) (“participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or
distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any
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same range of activities is implicated by these various references.74 As
stated in the most recent fact sheet issued by the IRS in this area, that set of
activities is broadly defined as “any and all activities that favor or oppose
one or more candidates for public office.”75 It is irrelevant whether the
candidates are for federal office or not; the definition encompasses activity
with respect local, state and even foreign candidates.76 The fact sheet
further states, consistent with prior IRS guidance,77 that while some
activities will clearly be political on their face others will require
“evaluation of all the facts and circumstances” to determine if they are in
fact political.78
candidate for public office”); 26 U.S.C. § 527(e)(2) (2000) (“influencing or attempting to
influence the selection, nomination, election, or appointment of any individual to any
Federal, State, or local public office or office in a political organization, or the election of
Presidential or Vice-Presidential electors, whether or not such individual or electors are
selected, nominated, elected, or appointed”); 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(4)-1 (2006) (“direct or
indirect participation or intervention in political campaigns on behalf of or in opposition to
any candidate for public office”).
74
See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL 7.25.4.7(2) (1999)
(“[t]he rules determining what constitutes intervention in a political campaign for an IRC
501(c)(4) organizations are the same as those governing IRC 501(c)(3) organizations”);
ABA Members Comment, supra note 59, at 144-45 (discussing IRS rulings indicating this
convergence); Frances R. Hill, Probing the Limits of Section 527 to Design a New
Campaign Finance Vehicle, TAX NOTES, Jan. 17, 2000, at 391 (noting the IRS’ reliance on
guidance issued with respect to Code section 501(c)(3) to determine whether an
organization qualified as a 527); Kingsley & Pomeranz, supra note 8, at 84-88 (discussing
IRS rulings indicating this convergence). There is no similar authority with respect to
Code section 162(e), but the similarity between its language and the language used in both
Code section 501(c)(3) and the regulations under Code section 501(c)(4) strongly suggests
the same definition applies. See supra note 73. The one major exception is that “exempt
function” activities under Code section 527 include activities designed to support or oppose
candidates for non-elected public offices and for offices with political organizations. See
26 U.S.C. § 527(e)(2) (2000); Kingsley & Pomerantz, supra note 8, at 88-91 (noting this
dissimilarity). It is generally assumed that few if any 527s engage in such activities to any
significant degree, however, particularly given that even charities (using tax deductible
contributions) can, to a limited degree, engage in such activity. See I.R.S. Announcement
88-114, 37 I.R.B. 26 (1988) (seeking public comments on, inter alia, whether expenditures
for such activities may be subject to tax under Code section 527 and stating that any such
tax shall only be applied prospectively once the IRS decides the issue, which it has yet to
do).
75
IRS Fact Sheet 2006-17 (released February 2006).
76
See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(iii) (including candidates for national, state, or
local office within the prohibition on charities engaging in political activity); James F.
Bloom et al., Foreign Activities of Domestic Charities and Foreign Charities, EXEMPT
ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION
PROGRAM FY1992, at 14 (stating that the prohibition against charities engaging in political
activity applies in foreign countries as well).
77
See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 2004-6 (relating to issue ads).
78
IRS Fact Sheet 2006-17.
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The result of this facts and circumstances approach is that it is difficult
to find a general principle that can be applied to determine if a given
activity is in fact “political” for tax purposes.79 Such a determination
instead must usually be based on the mix of precedential and nonprecedential guidance issued by the Treasury Department over the past
several decades that discusses the particular activity at issue, whether
communications to the public about candidates, candidate questionnaires,
voter guides, candidate appearances, or voter registration drives, to name a
few.80 For activities that on their face do not support, oppose, or perhaps
even mention a candidate, this uncertainty has allowed organizations to
influence the classification of such activities in part based on the
information made available to the IRS. For example, providing the IRS
with a blueprint of how an organization’s planned activity, nonpolitical on
its face, would affect elections was one means of having an organization
classified as a section 527 organization before the enactment of the
disclosure rules made that status less desirable.81 The difficulty of applying
this definition has, not surprisingly, led to a mixed record with respect to
enforcing the tax rules for political activity, as detailed below.82
C. Combining Election Law and Tax Law
The differences between the election law and tax law provisions
governing political activity led to a relatively sharp separation between the
two bodies of law in practice. Candidates, political parties and PACs
focused primarily on election law, as their only interaction with tax law was
if they had to file a one-page IRS form if they had sufficient noncontribution income to become subject to tax under Code section 527.83
Individuals and business entities that chose to be involved in politics also
probably focused primarily on election law, as the tax law was simple: no
deduction permitted for political activity expenditures.
79

See EO Committee of ABA Tax Section Offers Commentary on Politicking, 11
EXEMPT ORG. TAX. REV. 854, 856 (1995) (stating that the available rulings do not state
“any unifying principle”); Kingsley & Pomeranz, supra note 8, at 64-71 (observing that the
available rules “do not offer clear road signs, but rather mere examples”).
80
See Judith E. Kindell & John Francis Reilly, Election Year Issues, EXEMPT
ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION
PROGRAM FY2002, at 335, 369-384 (summarizing the numerous IRS rulings applying the
Code section 501(c)(3) definition of political activity to particular situations).
81
See Kingsley & Pomeranz, supra note 8, at 87 (noting that private letter rulings on
527s involved organizations that carefully and intentionally presented their activities as
designed to influence the election of candidates for public office).
82
See infra Part III.C.1.
83
IRS Form 1120-POL.

14-Aug-2006]

The Much Maligned 527

19

Tax-exempt entities, in contrast, tended to focus primarily on the tax
law requirements. Charities avoided all “political activity,” as defined
broadly by the tax laws, and assumed, generally correctly, that they
therefore were not engaging in any activities regulated by election law.
Other types of tax-exempt organization, such as social welfare groups, labor
organizations, and trade associations, while perhaps aware of the activities
governed by election law, generally avoided those activities. For the ones
that decided to engage in such activities, the most common route was to
establish a separate PAC to make campaign contributions so as to comply
with the prohibition on the use of corporate and union treasury funds for
such purposes.84 With the enactment of Code section 527, such separate
entities were also attractive because they could clearly avoid any income tax
by simply keeping their funds in non-interest bearing checking accounts.
But the rise of the so-called “stealth PAC” 527s led Congress to breach this
separation.85
Section 527 organizations were for many years not required to file any
publicly available information returns with the IRS, unlike most tax-exempt
organizations that are required to file an annual information return.86 This
lack of reporting was intentional, as Congress apparently assumed that
section 527 organizations would be subject to the reporting requirements of
federal or state election law.87 This assumption eventually proved incorrect,
however, as organizations realized and the IRS confirmed that the range of
political activities which could qualify an organization as tax-exempt under
Code section 527 was much broader than the range of activities governed
by federal or state election laws.88 This inconsistency led to the creation of
84

See supra note 25.
Previous overlaps between election law and tax law have not raised the same issues
as the current and proposed overlaps relating to 527s. The presidential candidate public
financing system is housed in the tax laws, but all authority over that system other than
cutting the actual checks is given to the FEC, not the IRS or the Treasury Department. See
2 U.S.C. § 437c(b)(1) (2000) (including the relevant sections of the Internal Revenue Code
in the laws the FEC is responsible to administer). The FEC also requires organizations
seeking to qualify for the Massachusetts Citizens for Life exception to be tax-exempt as
social welfare organizations, but since organizations must also have the characteristics
listed by the Supreme Court in that decision which tend to limit such organizations to
social welfare organizations anyway, this requirement has not prove controversial. See 11
C.F.R. § 114.10(c)
86
See 26 U.S.C. § 6033(a)(1) (2000). The major exception to this annual filing
requirement is for churches and church-related entities. See 26 U.S.C. § 6033(a)(2)(A)(i))
(2000).
87
See Hill, supra note 74, at 387, 390 & n.20 (suggesting that “there appears to have
been at least an implicit assumption that section 527 organizations would be subject to the
FECA” but also noting that “[l]ittle thought was given to the relation between section 527
and the new FECA”).
88
See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-52-026 (Oct. 1, 1996) (concluding that an
85
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“stealth” 527s that were under no obligation to file publicly available
reports under either election law or federal tax law.89 While the exact scale
of these stealth PACs’ operations are not known, reports indicate it was
substantial.90
To correct this oversight, Congress in 2000 passed amendments to Code
section 527 that not only imposed an annual IRS information return
requirement91 but that also imposed a periodic reporting regime for
contributors and expenditures mirroring the reporting regime for political
committees under election law.92 This reporting requirement includes an
obligation to inform the IRS of the 527’s existence within 24 hours of its
creation and an obligation to file a series of reports identifying the names,
addresses, employers and contribution amounts of all contributors who give
$200 or more during the year and the names, addresses and expenditure
amounts of all recipients of expenditures who receive $500 or more during
the year.93 Both the reporting schedule, with more frequent reports close to
election dates, and the required information were based on the existing
disclosure rules for PACs.94 The IRS has created an Internet accessible
organization qualified for tax-exempt status under Code section 527 even though it
designed its election-related activities to specifically avoid falling within the reach of
federal or state election laws); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-25-036 (Mar. 24, 1997) (same);
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 98-08-037 (Nov. 21, 1997) (same); see generally Hill, supra note 74
(reviewing these rulings).
89
See, e.g., Hill, supra note 87 (describing the IRS rulings that permitted such 527s).
90
See, e.g., COMMON CAUSE, UNDER THE RADAR: THE ATTACK OF THE “STEALTH
PACS”
ON
OUR
NATION’S
ELECTIONS
7-9
(2000),
available
at
http://web.archive.org/web/20011129075319/www.commoncause.org/publications/utr/steal
th.pdf (summarizing media reports regarding plans by 527s to spend in the aggregate tens
of millions of dollars during 2000).
91
See 26 U.S.C. § 6033(g) (2000 & Supp. III 2003).
92
Pub. L. 106-230, 114 Stat. 477 (2000) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. §§ 527(i),
(j) and other, scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). As later amended, there are exceptions for
527s that already provide similar disclosures under federal or state election law. 26 U.S.C.
§ 527(j)(5) (2000 & Supp. III 2003).
93
26 U.S.C. § 527(i), (j) (2000 & Supp. III 2003).
94
Compare 2 U.S.C. § 434(b)(3)(A) (requiring identification of each person, other
than a political committee, who makes contributions aggregating more than $200 during a
calendar year (or election cycle with respect to an authorized committee of a candidate for
federal office)), (5)(A) (requiring identification of each person to whom expenditures
aggregating in excess of $200 are made during a calendar year) (2000) with 26 U.SC. §
527(j)(3)(A) (requiring identification of each person to whom expenditures aggregating
$500 or more are made during a calendar year), (B) (requiring identification of each person
who makes contributions aggregating $200 or more during a calendar year) (2000 & Supp.
III 2003); compare 2 U.S.C. § 434(a)(4) (the reporting schedule for political committees
other than authorized committees of a candidate) (2000 & Supp. III 2003) and 26 U.S.C. §
572(j)(2) (the reporting schedule for 527s); see also H.R. REP. NO. 106-702, 17 (2000)
(stating, with respect to the H.R. 4717 Code section 527 disclosure provisions, which were
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database of these filings.95
The result of these new rules is that the IRS is now administering a
disclosure regime that is very similar to the regime that the FEC administers
with respect to candidate committees, political parties, and other political
committees. The new rules therefore raise a significant institutional choice
question: if the government can and will regulate the activities of 527s by
imposing disclosure requirements, is election law or tax law the best vehicle
through which to do so?
And this question has become even more important because of now
pending proposals to increase the regulation of 527s. The changes wrought
to election law by Congress in 2002 appear to have led to a significant flow
of funds into 527s that are not subject to election law, approaching half-abillion dollars in 2004, despite the new disclosure requirements.96 This
level of activity has led to calls also to impose funding restrictions on 527s
by redefining “political committee” to include most 527s.97 Such proposals
almost identical to the ones ultimately enacted, that the reporting periods and deadlines
were generally the same as those under FECA).
95
See www.irs.gov/charities/political/article/0,,id=109644,00.html. Congress required
such a database with respect to the names of 527s, 26 U.S.C. § 6104(a)(3) (2000), but the
IRS also created a database with the complete notification forms and periodic reports.
96
Center for Public Integrity, 527s in 2004 Shatter Previous Records for Political
Fundraising
(Dec.
16,
2004),
available
at
The extent to which this flow
www.publicintegrity.org/527/report.aspx?aid=435.
represented an increase from earlier presidential election years is not completely clear
because of the lack of reporting by 527s before the enactment of the new disclosure rules in
the middle of 2000, although there are reports indicating 527s planned to spend tens of
millions of dollars in 2000. See COMMON CAUSE, supra note 90, at 7-9. Commentators
have traced at least part of the increase to a shift in soft money contributions by labor
unions from political parties to 527s, but it primarily appears to have come from
individuals, particularly individuals making large contributions; corporations generally did
not shift their soft money contributions from political parties to 527s but instead appeared
to have simply stopped giving soft money. Briffault, supra note 8, at 963-64; Meredith A.
Johnston, Note, Stopping “Winks and Nods”: Limits on Coordination as a Means of
Regulating 527 Organizations, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1166, 1180-81 (2006).
97
See, e.g., 527 Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 513, 109th Cong., § 2 (2005); 527 Reform
Act of 2005, S. 1053, 109th Cong., § 2 (2005). At least one state has already passed such a
law. See 2005 W. VA. LAWS 4th Ex. Sess. ch. 9 (codified at W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-812(g) (West 2006) (limiting contributions to a 527 from any one person to $2,000 per
election cycle). The FEC also considered changing the regulatory definition of political
committee to encompass many if not most 527s, but ultimately chose not to do so. 69 FED.
REG. 68056, 68063-65 (Nov. 23, 2004); see also Press Release, Federal Election
Commission, FEC Accepts Remand in Shays v. FEC and Bush-Cheney ’04 v. FEC (May
31, 2006) (stating that the FEC has decided to provide a more thorough explanation of its
earlier decision not to change the regulatory definition of political committee because court
challenges to that decision had let to a court decision remanding that issue back to the FEC
with the option of providing further explanation).
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would in effect create a bi-furcated regulatory structure: the FEC would
continue to be responsible for administering the political committee
restrictions, but the IRS would continue to be responsible for administering
Code section 527 and therefore making determinations regarding what
organizations fall within that section.98 Whether it is wise to do so requires
considering the issue of institutional choice more generally.
II. HOW TO CHOOSE
A. Choice Scholarship Generally
Scholars discussing the choice of regulators for pursuing a particular
policy goal usually focus on which branch or level of government is the
most appropriate institution to develop and adopt the laws to further the
policy, or whether a government institution is the most appropriate vehicle
as compared to the market.99 They therefore need to wrestle with issues
such as federalism, the relative competencies of the courts versus the
political branches, and the relative competencies of administrative agencies
compared to the legislature.100 They do not usually focus on choosing
98

The legislation actually provides that it only applies to organizations that have given
the notice to the IRS that they are in fact 527s, so it is unclear whether it would apply to an
organization that is in fact described in Code section 527 but chooses not to provide that
notice. See infra note 142 (noting the current uncertainty regarding whether 527 status is
elective or mandatory). Presumably, however, the sponsors of the legislation do not expect
organizations to be able to avoid the new definition simply by claiming, incorrectly, that
they fall under another tax-exemption provision of the Code.
99
See, e.g., Joan MacLeod Heminway, Rock, Paper, Scissors: Choosing the Right
Vehicle for Federal Corporate Governance Initiatives, 10 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 225
(2005) (comparing Congress, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the courts);
Benjamin H. Barton, An Institutional Analysis of Lawyer Regulation: Who Should Control
Lawyer Regulation—Courts, Legislatures, or the Market?, 37 GA. L. REV. 1167 (2003)
(comparing state and federal courts and legislatures to each other and to the market);
William W. Buzbee, Sprawl’s Dynamics: A Comparative Institutional Analysis Critique,
35 WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW 509 (2000) (comparing institutions at federal, state and
local levels of government to each other and the market).
100
See generally NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING
INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994); JERRY L. MASHAW,
GREED, CHAOS, & GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW (1997);
Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the
Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393 (1996). There is also literature
regarding how interpretation of laws is affected by the branch of government with the
authority to interpret them. See, e.g., Ellen P. Aprill, The Interpretive Voice, 38 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 2081 (2005) (exploring court versus executive branch interpretation of the tax law);
Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV.
885, 886 (2003) (arguing in part that debates over legal interpretation can only be resolved
by understanding the abilities and limitations of the institutions engaged in the
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between two substantive bodies of law, both enacted by the same legislature
but administered by different agencies.
The one significant exception is the “tax expenditures” literature written
in response to the use by Congress and state legislatures of tax law to
further non-tax policy goals. A tax expenditure is a tax law provision that
departs from the “pure” version of tax law under which all taxpayers are
taxed on their true, economic income.101 For example, the exclusion from
taxable income of employer-paid health insurance and other employee
benefits is generally considered a tax expenditure because as an economic
matter such benefits represent income to the employees.102
Scholars in this area focus on determining whether identified non-tax
policy goals are best accomplished through the tax law administered by the
IRS or through a different body of law administered by a different
agency.103 But almost all of this scholarship focuses on goals that involve
government economic aid and so relies primarily on economic factors that
interpretation).
101
Stanley Surrey began this literature in 1967 when he introduced the concept of. See
STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE CONCEPT OF TAX EXPENDITURES
3-4 (Harv. Univ. Press 1973) (recounting his November 15, 1967 speech as Assistant
Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy which developed the concept of “tax
expenditures”); see also Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing
Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L.
REV. 705 (1970) (further developing this concept); STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R.
MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES (Harv. Univ. Press 1985) (exploring the uses of this
concept).
102
See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2006-2010 (JCS-2-06) (Apr. 25, 2006), at 3-4. Both the
federal government and many state governments have institutionalized the concept of tax
expenditures by regularly producing annual tax expenditure budgets. See 2 U.S.C. §
639(c)(3) (2000); 31 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(16) (2000) (requiring a list of tax expenditures to be
included in the budget submitted by the President to Congress); OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT
AND BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT: ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES,
FISCAL YEAR 2007, at 285-328 (2006) (tax expenditure estimates for fiscal years 2005
through 2011); STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra (prepared for
congressional committees); Herman P. Ayayo, Tax Expenditures: Useful Economic
Concept or Budgetary Dinosaur?, 93 TAX NOTES 1152, 1153 (2001) (stating that 33 states
prepare tax expenditure budgets on a regular basis).
103
See, e.g., Ann L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of
Tax-Based Welfare Reform, 108 HARV. L. REV. 533 (1995) (discussing the earned income
tax credit, an earnings subsidy to low-income workers provided through the tax system);
Maureen B. Cavanaugh, On the Road to Incoherence: Congress, Economics, and Taxes, 49
UCLA L. REV. 685 (2002) (discussing tax-free employee benefits); Tracy A. Kaye,
Sheltering Social Policy in the Tax Code: The Low-Income Housing Credit, 38 VILL. L.
REV. 872 (1993); David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and
Spending Programs, 113 YALE L.J. 955, 997-1026 (2004) (discussing food stamps and the
earned income tax credit).
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do not apply to a regulatory program, such as regulating independent
political activity.104 It is therefore necessary to develop a new framework
that relies on non-economic factors to choose between bodies of substantive
law when a regulatory – as opposed to economic – result is the goal.
B. A Proposed Framework
Bodies of substantive law may differ in the legislative processes that
create them, the administrative agencies that interpret and enforce them, and
the actual or likely effectiveness of that administration. The differences in
each of these areas can guide us in determining where it would be most
appropriate to house a particular regulatory structure.105
1. Legislative Processes
The legislative process for particular sets of laws can vary with respect
to the substantive expertise of the legislators or committees who are in a
position to most influence the form of the new laws, the extent of
coordination of those laws with other laws affecting the same activities or
persons, the degree to which the process is captured by a limited group of
constituencies, and the visibility of the process to the public at large. Since
control over legislative drafting and approval tends to rest primarily with
the relevant congressional committees, it is appropriate to focus primarily
on the committee part of the process.106
104

See, e.g., SURREY, supra note 101, at 134-36 (examining who is actually
economically benefited from tax provisions and noting that tax deductions provide an
upside-down subsidy by providing a greater financial benefit to higher income taxpayers
than to lower income ones), 144 (noting the lack of periodic budget review for tax
expenditures); SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 101, at 71-82 (further developing the
upside-down subsidy issue), 102-03 (noting the lack of a cap on tax expenditure
provisions) (1985); Cavanaugh, supra note 103 (arguing that taxes may be the optimal
means to control externalities); Edward Yorio, The President’s Tax Proposals: A Major
Step in the Right Direction, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 1255 (1985) (focusing on equity and
efficiency concerns);
Edward A. Zelinsky, Efficiency and Income Taxes: The
Rehabilitation of Tax Incentives, 64 TEX. L. REV. 973, 978 (1986) (same). This literature
does occasionally mention non-economic factors, as detailed in infra Part II.B.
105
It is assumed for purposes of this Article that the genesis of a regulatory structure is
in a legislative body as opposed to an administrative agency or the courts, although both of
the latter bodies play critical roles in the interpretation and enforcement of legislatively
enacted rules.
106
See, e.g., Randall S. Kroszner & Thomas Stratmann, Corporate Campaign
Contributions, Repeat Giving, and the Rewards of Legislator Reputation, 49 J.L. & ECON.
41, 43-45, (2005) (noting that the congressional committee system provides a mechanism
for legislators to build credible reputations in specific policy areas, reputations that the
authors finds are rewarded by repeat PAC contributions); Edward A. Zelinsky, James
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Expertise. Congressional tax-writing committees collectively lack
expertise in non-tax matters, although individual members will have
expertise in various non-tax areas. The result of this lack of expertise is that
such committees may be less able to design effective (tax) laws to further
non-tax policy goals when compared with their counterparts on committees
that focus on such goals.107 For example, it would generally be expected
that the House Committee on Agriculture would have more expertise with
respect to farming issues than the House Ways and Means Committee.
Coordination. If responsibility for laws affecting the same activities or
persons is split between the tax-writing committees and other congressional
committees, this split may result in tax laws that counter instead of reinforce
laws passed by those other committees. For example, Professor Thuronyi
noted that the tax law encouraged dairy farmers to increase their production
while at the same time agricultural subsidies encouraged them to decrease
He therefore argued that if instead the same
their production.108
congressional committee reviewed all subsidies in a particular substantive
area, more consistent and efficient subsidies would result.109
At the same time, if the laws affecting certain activities or persons relate
to tax laws or policies then coordination with the tax laws through the taxwriting committees may be more desirable.110 For example, pension plans
are required to meet a complex set of requirements in order to be taxexempt.111 If Congress wants to enact other laws to encourage participation
in private pension plans, a non-tax goal, a failure to coordinate those laws
with the existing tax requirements could result in inconsistent requirements
and incentives.
Madison and Public Choice at Gucci Gulch: A Procedural Defense of Tax Expenditures
and Tax Institutions, 102 YALE L.J. 1165, 1187 & n.5 (1993) (stating that the consensus
among scholars studying Congress is that domination of the relevant committee leads to an
outcome more favorable to the controlling party).
107
Edward Yorio, Equity, Efficiency, and the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 55 FORDHAM L.
REV. 395, 425 (1987); SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 101, at 106-07 (1985). But see E.
Zelinsky, supra note 106 (criticizing the focus on the expertise of congressional
committees as ignoring the agency problem created by limited constituencies capturing
such committees).
108
Victor Thuronyi, Tax Expenditures: A Reassessment, 1988 DUKE L.J. 1155, 1161.
109
Ibid. But see David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and
Spending Programs, 113 YALE L.J. 955, 994 (2004) (criticizing this example as applied to
the agency level because the tax subsidies for farmers are part of a larger pro-business
investment tax regime that the IRS may be the best agency to coordinate even though the
Department Agriculture may be the best agency to regulate farmers specifically).
110
See Thuronyi, supra note 108, at 1192-93 (noting that transferring jurisdiction over
a tax provision that serves both tax and non-tax goals to a non-tax agency could complicate
tax-policy decisions).
111
See 26 U.S.C. §§ 401-420 (2000).
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Capture. Congressional committees that focus on a particular policy
area (e.g., agriculture) may be prone to capture by the limited constituencies
most affected by government policy in that area (e.g., farmers).112 Professor
Zelinsky has therefore asserted that the legislative process is more likely to
generate laws free from interest group capture and with greater legitimacy
under pluralist criteria if that process subjects the laws to the scrutiny and
influence of more and more diverse constituencies.113 He therefore
contrasted the tax-writing committees, which tend to attract the attention of
a large number of constituencies and whose members tend to receive
campaign contributions from a large number and variety of sources, with
committees focused on other specific subject areas that tend to attract
attention and campaign contributions only from a much smaller set of
constituencies with vested interests in the subject matter of the
committee.114
Visibility. The actions of congressional committees that focus on a
particular policy area may be more visible to the public than tax-writing
committees that approve tax provisions that touch on numerous non-tax
areas.115 To the extent such committees receive only the attention of limited
constituencies, however, this may reduce their visibility and so their
accountability for their decisions. If the latter effect dominates, tax-writing
committees may be held more accountable because the provisions they
enact are reviewed and publicized by more constituencies.116
The activities of tax-writing committees may also be less visible
because of framing effects, e.g., the ability of the tax-writing committees to
characterize the laws they approve as “tax cuts” rather than “increased
government spending” and so less subject to critical scrutiny. The tax
expenditure concept is in large part an attempt to eliminate these framing
effects, but there are reasons to believe that more than 30 years after the
112

See generally Thomas W. Merrill, Institutional Choice and Political Faith, 22 LAW
& SOC. INQUIRY 959 (1997) (book review) (describing the recent history of academic
thought regarding capture by interest groups).
113
Zelinsky, supra note 106.
114
Zelinsky, supra note 106, at 1177-84. For an attempt to formally model this
difference between tax-writing committees and other committees, see Dhammika
Dharmapala, Comparing Tax Expenditures and Direct Subsidies: The Role of Legislative
Committee Structure, 72 J. PUB. ECON. 421 (1998).
115
See SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 101, at 104-05; Boris I. Bittker, Accounting
for Federal “Tax Subsidies” in the National Budget, 22 NAT’L TAX J. 244, 244-45 (1969).
But see Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 109, at 969-70 (rejecting this visibility argument
because of the increased public discussion of tax breaks and the potential for hidden
subsidies in other, non-tax areas of law).
116
See Zelinsky, supra note 106, at 1184 (noting that it appears the general media
covers the tax-related institutions of government to a greater extent than more narrowly
focused government institutions).
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institutionalization of that concept this effect still exists.117
2. Administrative Agencies
Government agencies also differ from each other in ways similar to
those found in the legislative process. Agencies have different areas of
substantive expertise, usually have strong intra-agency coordination but
difficulty coordinating with other agencies, may be captured by limited
constituencies, and vary in their accountability to the public.
Expertise. Government agencies naturally develop expertise in their
substantive areas of activity. Such expertise can lead to quicker and more
accurate interpretation and enforcement of laws.118 Lack of expertise may
leave an agency incapable of effectively administering laws when compared
to an agency with the appropriate expertise.119
Coordination. In general, a single government agency is better at
coordinating activities within the agency (i.e., has lower costs of
coordination) than coordinating activities with other agencies.120 This has
led Professors Weisbach and Nussim to conclude in the context of
government transfer programs that integration with the tax laws will be
most successful when the coordination benefits between the tax system and
the other program are high and the specialization benefits of a separate
program are low.121 In some cases Congress has created joint authority over
117

See Edward A. Zelinsky, Do Tax Expenditures Create Framing Effects? Volunteer
Firefighters, Property Tax Exemptions, and the Paradox of Tax Expenditure Analysis, 24
VA. TAX. REV. 797 (2005) (arguing that for some or even many members of the public
policies that are unacceptable when framed as direct government expenditures become
desirable when framed as tax subsidies even though the policies are substantively and
economically equivalent). But see Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 109, at 970-71
(rejecting this framing argument both because framing effects can be overcome by greater
publicity for tax expenditures and because if it is valid, there is the members of the public
who are subject to framing effects will also be likely to miss the often subtle effects of nontax programs). For a more general consideration of common cognitive errors when
considering tax-related issues, see Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, Thinking About
Tax, 12 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 106 (2006).
118
See Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 109, at 985-86 (noting that specialization
generally allows an individual or organization to perform the same activity more rapidly,
more accurately, or better in some other dimension).
119
See Yorio, supra note 107, at 425 (noting that the IRS generally has no expertise in
areas outside of tax and so is less likely to effectively administer tax laws designed to
further non-tax policy goals).
120
See Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 109, at 985 (noting that separating a function
into a separate division promotes coordination within that division but at the cost of
increased coordination costs between that division and other activities of the same
organization).
121
Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 109, at 996; see also SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra
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certain areas in an attempt to overcome the usually high costs of
interagency coordination. These attempts to overcome the increased costs
of coordination between agencies have had mixed results at best,
however.122
Capture. The constituencies with particular interest in a certain
substantive area may be able to capture an agency that specializes in that
area. That capture may occur because those constituencies have strong
influence with the congressional committees overseeing the agency,
because those constituencies provide “revolving door” job opportunities to
employees leaving that agency, or simply because those constituencies are
the only ones willing to invest the time and resources to engage the agency
when it is interpreting or enforcing the laws at issue. This capture may be
enhanced or inhibited by the degree to which the agency and its employees
are subject to political pressures from Congress or from political appointees
within the Executive branch.
Accountability. An agency with sole responsibility for a particular
substantive area may be subject to a greater degree of accountability with
respect to activities in that area as compared to an agency that has
responsibility for several areas. The degree to which the agency’s activities
area visible to the public, whether because of congressional or media
note 101, at 106 (noting the confusion that can be created when both the Treasury
Department and another executive agency have responsibility over the same area).
122
See, e.g., George Robert Johnson, Jr., The Split-Enforcement Model: Some
Conclusions from the OSHA and MSHA Experiences, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 315 (1987)
(noting the problems in the split-enforcement of the Occupational Safety and Health Act);
Alan Larsen, National Game Ranges: The National Wildlife Refuge System, 6 ENVTL. L.
515, 525-29 (1975) (describing the conflicts created by dual management of game ranges,
which are federal lands that are available for the grazing of domestic livestock); Joseph A.
Lumsdaine, Ocean Dumping Regulation: An Overview, 5 ECOLOGY L.Q. 753, 792 (1976)
(criticizing the results of joint administration of the Marine Protection, Research, and
Sanctuaries Act); Sidney Shapiro & Thomas O. McGarity, Reorienting OSHA: Regulatory
Alternatives and Legislative Reform, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 57-63 (1989) (noting the
problems in the split-enforcement of the Occupational Safety and Health Act and
recommending elimination of the split); James R. Weiss & Martin L. Stern, Serving Two
Masters: The Dual Jurisdiction of the FCC and the Justice Department Over
Telecommunications Transactions, 6 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 195 (1998) (noting
problems with the split-enforcement of antitrust standards for telecommunications
transactions). But see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Enforcing Aviation Safety Regulations: The
Case for a Split-Enforcement Model of Agency Adjudication, 4 ADMIN. L. REV. 389 (1991)
(arguing for enforcement for federal aviation safety rules to be moved from the Federal
Aviation Administration, a part of the Department of Transportation, to the independent
National Transportation Safety Board); Paul R. Verkuil, The Independence of Independent
Agencies: The Purposes and Limits of Independent Agencies, 1988 DUKE L.J. 257, 268-70
(1988) (citing advantages to split-administration of laws when one of the parties involved
is an independent agency, including an increased perception of fairness).

14-Aug-2006]

The Much Maligned 527

29

attention, may also affect its accountability.
3. Effectiveness
Comparisons of the legislative process and the administering agency to
determine which legal vehicle is best suited to pursue a particular non-tax
goal are only part of the story. The story would not be complete without
comparing how effective each substantive body of law, and therefore each
implementing agency, is likely to be in implementing the law and so
achieving the policy goal at issue. Relevant considerations include the
effectiveness of enforcement by the applicable agency, the compliance
burden on the regulated community, and the degree to which choice of legal
vehicle creates opportunities for administrative arbitrage.
Enforcement Effectiveness. The effectiveness of enforcement may vary
depending on what legal vehicle is chosen. If the agency charged with
enforcing the laws already has established enforcement procedures and
resources that are well tailored to the new regulatory scheme, then
enforcement may be relatively effective. If the agency instead has
enforcement procedures that are ill-adapted to the new laws, the
effectiveness of enforcement may be low unless the agency can easily adopt
new procedures. For example, using tax law allows enforcement through
the existing tax collection infrastructure.123 Whether that enhances
enforcement will depend on whether the aspects of that infrastructure – e.g.,
an experienced and national field staff, established legal support, the
“intimidation” effect of the IRS, low audit coverage, a focus on tracking
dollar amounts, significant time periods between activities and audit – fit
well with the provision at issue. Agencies may also differ with respect to
their available enforcement resources, and with respect to their litigation
options if administrative enforcement proceedings fail.
Compliance Burden. The cost and therefore extent of compliance may
vary depending on what legal vehicle is chosen. For example, if the laws
governing a particular set of activities are spread among two or more
substantive bodies of law, thereby requiring the regulated community to
master – or hire experts in – both bodies of law, the cost of compliance may
be significantly higher than if those laws were located in a single area.
Similarly, if administration of those laws is split between two different
agencies with different procedures, the cost of compliance may be higher.
Arbitrage Opportunities. If the laws governing the same set of activities
or persons are split between two or more substantive areas of law and so
two or more government agencies, opportunities for administrative arbitrage
123

See Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 109, at 980 (making this point).
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may arise. This result may arise from coordination failures at either the
legislative or agency level. For example, the rise of the 527s reflects such a
failure as Congress’ apparent assumption that 527s would all be subject to
federal or state election law disclosure requirements was incorrect because
of the differing definitions of “political activity” for election law and tax
law purposes, thereby permitting the creation of organizations that escaped
the disclosure requirements of both bodies of law.124
III. MAKING THE CHOICE
As the first Part of this Article detailed, the overall goal of regulating
political activity is to balance preventing corruption, preventing the
appearance of corruption, and promoting political equality with protecting
freedom of speech and association.125 The tools that Congress uses to strike
this balance are a mix of disclosure requirements and restrictions, although
the exact parameters of these requirements and restrictions are hotly
debated. This Part applies the framework developed above to this policy
goal.
A. Legislative Processes
1. Election Law
The 2002 changes to election law were the result of a lengthy,
convoluted, and high profile legislative process. While it is difficult to
establish a firm start date for that process, it began no later than the
introduction of the first major reform bill in 1998.126 Detailed House
Committee on Government Reform and Oversight and Senate Committee
on Government Affairs investigations into the 1996 federal elections in
large part motivated that legislation.127 The next four years involved
extensive legislative maneuvering and debates as the supporters of the
legislation forced floor consideration of successive versions of the bill even

124

See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text.
126
See Bipartisan Campaign Integrity Act of 1997, H.R. 2183, 105th Cong. (1998);
McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp.2d 176, 202 (D.D.C. 2003) (detailing the legislative
origins of BCRA).
127
See SENATE COMM. ON GOV’T AFFAIRS, INVESTIGATION OF ILLEGAL OR IMPROPER
ACTIVITIES IN CONNECTION WITH 1996 FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGNS, S. Rep. No. 105167 (6 volumes) (1998); Campaign Finance Investigation: Hearings Before the House
Comm. on Gov’t Reform and Oversight, 105th Cong. 6 (1997), 1997 WL 621855
(statement of Dan Burton, Chairman).
125
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when faced with unsupportive congressional committees.128 The ultimate
result of this bruising debate was significant but arguably limited changes to
election law.129 For example, the electioneering communications provisions
initially covered a much broader range of communications but had to be
pared back before they could be enacted.130
The legislative history of other election law provisions reveals a similar
level of debate and attention. The initial ban on corporate campaign
contributions and the initial federal disclosure rules were considered
important enough to justify mentions President Theodore Roosevelt’s State
of the Union addresses,131 numerous congressional hearings and
complicated political maneuvering.132 And the legislative debate for both
128

See McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 202-05 (summarizing this maneuvering,
including the unfavorable report of the Committee on House Administration and the failure
of the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration to act on the 1999 version of the
bill); 2 CIS PL 107155, 107 CIS Legis. Hist. P.L. 155 (listing from 1998 forward hundreds
of pages of House reports, over a thousand pages of hearing transcripts, and many days of
congressional debates that lay behind the 2002 election law changes).
129
See Thomas E. Mann, Linking Knowledge and Action: Political Science and
Campaign Finance Reform, 1 PERSPECTIVE ON POLITICS 69, 79-80 (2003) (concluding that
“the new law is a relatively modest, incremental undertaking”). But see BRADLEY A.
SMITH, UNFREE SPEECH: THE FOLLY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM xiv (2003)
(concluding that BCRA is “far reaching legislation” that “federalizes much state and local
activity” and “sharply curtails the rights of citizens to publicly criticize . . . officeholders
and candidates”).
130
Compare H.R. 2183, 105th Cong. § 201(b) (including within an expanded
definition of express advocacy both any radio or television paid advertisement transmitted
within 60 days of an election in the relevant state and any communication “expressing
unmistakable and unambiguous support for or opposition to one or more clearly identified
candidates when taken as a whole and with limited reference to external events, such as
proximity to an election”) with 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(i) (2000 & Supp. III 2003) (limited
electioneering communications to broadcast, cable, or satellite communications which refer
to a clearly identified candidate within 30 days of a primary election (or nominating
convention or caucus) and 60 days of a general election and reach the relevant electorate).
131
See 40 CONG. REC. 96 (1905) (President Roosevelt supporting a proposed ban on
corporate campaign contributions in his 1905 State of the Union address); 41 CONG. REC.
96 (1905) (same in his 1906 State of the Union address); 42 CONG. REC. 67, at 78 (1907)
(President Roosevelt supporting the disclosure of campaign contributions and expenditures
in his 1907 State of the Union address). Other campaign finance proposals have also made
their way into State of the Union addresses speeches of later Presidents. See, e.g., 112
CONG. REC. 141, at 143 (1966) (President Johnson proposing the revision and loosening
of election law provisions); 139 Cong. Rec. H674 (1993) (President Clinton supporting
campaign finance legislation); 143 Cong. Rec. H273, at H274 (1997) (same); 144 Cong.
Rec. H30, at H34 (1998) (same).
132
See MUTCH, supra note 14, at 6-16. One significant piece of election law
legislation, the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, apparently had a very limited
legislative history, but it represented essentially a recodification of existing campaign
finance law that had been extensively debated and reviewed earlier, with the only major
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the 1971 enactment of FECA and its 1974 amendment was also
extensive.133 Both FECA, as amended in 1974, and the 2002 election law
changes also had to survive exhaustive litigation challenges.134
2. Tax Law
The tax law provisions relating to political activity have historically had
much briefer and less exciting legislative histories. As noted previously,
there is essentially no administrative or legislative history for the general
rule that expenditures for political activities are not deductible, although
both the House and Senate tax-writing committees ultimately considered
and approved that provision.135 The statutory prohibition on political
activity for charities has a similar lack of legislative history, as then-Senator
Lyndon Johnson introduced it as an amendment to an almost-final tax bill
and so it completely avoided any committee consideration.136 The taxchange being that it no longer reached primary elections as required by the Supreme
Court’s decision in United States v. Newberry, 256 U.S. 232 (1921). See MUTCH, supra
note 14, at 16-21.
133
See 74 CIS PL 93443; 93 CIS Legis. Hist. P.L. 443 (listing the six House and
Senate reports and five hearings that related to the 1974 to FECA); 72 CIS PL 92225, 92
CIS Legis. Hist. P.L. 225 (listing the ten House and Senate reports and six hearings that
related to the 1971 enactment of FECA).
134
See MUTCH, supra note 14, at 49-51 (detailing the breadth of the Buckley legal
assault on FECA, as amended, and the credentials of those involved); McConnell v. FEC,
540 U.S. 93, 93 (2003) (listing the appellants in the case challenging the 2002 changes,
who included Senators, members of Congress, major political parties, and various
advocacy, labor and business associations); McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp.2d 176, 183
(noting that the case involved eleven consolidated actions), 208 (noting that after some
initial dismissals, the case still involved seventy-seven plaintiffs and seventeen defendants)
(2003). Recognizing the importance and complexity of these cases, the Supreme Court in
each instance extended the total time for oral argument from one to four hours. See
McConnell v. FEC, 539 U.S. 911 (2003) (allocating four hours for oral argument); Buckley
v. Valeo, 423 U.S. 820 (same) (1975); S. Ct. Rule 28, ¶ 3 (Supp. III 2003) (allowing onehalf hour per side of oral argument absent a request for additional time, and stating that
additional time is “rarely accorded”); S. Ct. Rule 44, ¶ 3 (1970) (allowing one-half hour per
side of oral argument absent a request for additional time).
135
See supra note 56.
136
See Oliver A. Houck, “On the Limits of Charity: Lobbying, Litigation, and
Electoral Politics by Charitable Organizations Under the Internal Revenue Code and
Related Laws,” 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 23-29 (2003) (reviewing the incomplete historical
record of the reasons for then Senator Lyndon B. Johnson’s introduction of an amendment
that added the prohibition on political campaign activities to Code section 501(c)(3)
apparently in reaction to the opposition by section 501(c)(3) organizations during his 1954
primary campaign); Kindell & Reilly, supra note 80, at 335-36 (noting the lack of
legislative history for the prohibition), 448-51 (discussing speculation regarding why
Senator Johnson introduced the amendment but concluding it is impossible to be sure of his
actual motivation).
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writing committees and Congress as a whole did not apparently see the
enactment of Code section 527 as a significant event either. Section 527’s
legislative history covers only a handful of pages and is intermixed with
discussions of the tax provisions relating to upholstery and needles with
which it was packaged.137
Even the 527 disclosure provisions have a relatively short legislative
history. The first bill including them was introduced in April 2000, in part
in reaction to the role of “stealth” 527s during the presidential primary
election that year.138 At first they appeared doomed to die in committee, but
their supporters managed to force their consideration by threatening to sink
the Defense Department’s reauthorization bill by adding them to that
legislation.139 Within three months of their initial introduction, and after
only a brief tax-writing committee report on a related bill and a single
hearing by the House Subcommittee on Oversight, the provisions became
law.140
Perhaps not coincidentally, litigation challenges to these rules have also
been much less involved affairs. The courts have generally concluded that
since these tax provisions only affect the cost of participating in political
activities but do not prohibit such participation, they will be upheld in the
face of constitutional challenges.141 The 527 disclosure provisions survived
137

See H.R. 93-1502, at 103-13 (1974), S. Rep. 93-1357, at 25-36 (1974); H.R. Rep.
93-1642, at 22-23 (1974); William P. Streng, The Federal Tax Treatment of Political
Contributions and Political Organizations, 29 THE TAX LAWYER 139, 140 (1975) (noting
that Code section 527 was a noncontroversial addition to a “Christmas tree” tax bill).
138
See, e.g., Underground Campaign Disclosure Act, H.R. 4168, 106th Cong. (2000)
(introduced Apr. 4, 2000).
139
146 CONG. REC. S4656-S4660 (daily ed. June 7, 2000) (Sen. McCain offering 527
disclosure provisions as an amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2001, S. 2549, 106th Cong. (2000)). The amendment would almost certainly
have been fatal to the bill because the Constitution requires that revenue-generating
provisions originate in the House. See U.S. Const. Art. I, section 6, first paragraph. The
addition by the Senate of a tax provision to the reauthorization bill would have exposed
that bill to being “blue-slipped” as a revenue bill that failed to meet this constitutional
requirement. See 146 CONG. REC. S4785 (daily ed. June 7, 2000) (Sen. Sessions noting the
risk this amendment created to the bill).
140
See Pub. L. 106-230, 114 Stat. 477 (2000); H.R. Rep. 106-702 (2000); Public
Disclosure by Tax Exempt Organization: Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on
Oversight, 106th Cong. (2000), 2000 WL 852654 (statement of Amo Houghton,
Chairman).
141
Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 143-44 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (relating to
the Code section 501(c)(3) prohibition of political activity for charities); see also
Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 512-13 (1959) (rejecting a constitutional
challenge to the Treasury Department’s denial of a deduction for lobbying expenditures on
the grounds that, like everyone else, the taxpayers were “simply being required to pay for
those activities entirely out of their own pockets”); see generally Donald B Tobin,
Anonymous Speech and Section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code, 37 GA. L. REV. 611,
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challenge on essentially the same grounds, as the Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit concluded that to avoid them an organization only had to
forgo claiming tax-exempt status under Code section 527.142 Some 527
organizations may also have intentionally chosen to not identify
contributors who prefer to remain anonymous, viewing that choice as an
election they make at the cost of the additional tax owed.143
3. Comparing the Processes
Considering these processes in light of the expertise, coordination,
capture, and visibility factors identified earlier, reveals reasons to favor
incorporating restrictions and disclosure requirements into election law as
opposed to tax law. Expertise and capture probably do not favor either
body of law over the other for a simple reason: both bodies of law are
considered by incumbent politicians, regardless of which specific
congressional committees are involved in the legislative processes. As
experienced politicians, they are eminently familiar with the corruption and
appearance of corruption concerns raised by political activity expenditures
and with balancing those concerns against the freedom of speech and
association concerns implicated when regulating such expenditures, as the
Supreme Court repeatedly acknowledged in its decision upholding almost
all of the 2002 changes to election law.144 At the same time, such
politicians, regardless of on which committee they serve, are all part of the
638-44 (2003) (discussing the subsidy/penalty rationale that protects tax provisions,
including those related to political activity, from successful constitutional challenge on free
speech or association grounds).
142
Mobile Republican Assembly v. United States, 353 F.3d 1357, 1361-62 (11th Cir.
2003). The IRS apparently believes that 527 status or at least the Code section 527 taxes
are mandatory, not elective, . See I.R.S. Field Serv. Advisory 2000-37-040 (June 19, 2000)
(stating “[s]ection 527 is not an elective provision”); Edited Transcript of the January 30,
2004 ABA Tax Section EO Committee Meeting, 44 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 23, 29 (2004)
(a senior IRS Chief Counsel official stating in the wake of the 11th Circuit decision that
whether an organization chooses to file notice as a 527 is voluntary, but that being a
political organization is not, and therefore a political organization is subject to the taxes
provided by Code section 527 if it chooses not to file such notice or files such notice but
fails to file the required disclosure reports).
143
The government appears to permit such an election, as it conceded that this was an
option for 527s when it defended the disclosure provisions against a constitutional
challenge. Brief of the United States of America in Support of Its Motion to Dismiss at n.
4 & accompanying text, Nat’l Fed’n of Republican Assemblies v. United States, 148 F.
Supp. 2d 1273 (S.D. Ala. 2001) (No. 00-759-Rv-C).
144
E.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 137, 158. But see McConnell, 540 U.S. at
339 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that in
enacting, in his view, the vague and overbroad electioneering communications provisions,
Congress has demonstrated a “fundamental misunderstanding of the First Amendment”).
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interest group that arguably presents the greatest danger of capturing the
legislative process to pursue its own interests above the interest of others
and of the public generally.145
Visibility and coordination present more complicated issues. With
respect to the former, it has been argued that as a general matter tax laws are
subject to greater visibility than laws in other substantive areas because the
media and a larger number and range of interest groups pay attention to the
activities of the tax-writing committees.146 But in the specific context of
political activity, the opposite appears to be the case. Tax law provisions
relating to political activity receive scant attention while election law
provisions are the subject of extensive debate and coverage.147 The reason
for the lack of attention to political activity-related tax provisions may rest
on a simple fact: they do not involve much money.148 As such they are of
little interest to the interest groups and, probably, the media that normally
cover the tax-writing committees. Election law provisions have been, in
contrast, some of the highest profile pieces of legislation and so become
subject to a high level of public scrutiny.
As for coordination, recall that tax law, until the enactment of the 527
disclosure provisions, focused on ensuring the use of after-tax dollars for
political activity – i.e., the cost of engaging in such activity.149 Election
law, in contrast, focused on the disclosure of and restrictions on such
activity.150 This division of responsibility suggests that new laws seeking to
decrease or increase the cost of such activity would be better coordinated
with the existing tax law provisions, while new laws seeking to disclosure
or restrict such activity would be better coordinated with the existing
election law provisions.151 This conclusion is reinforced by the general bias
145

See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 262-63 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (criticizing BCRA for protecting incumbent politicians from criticism, although he
stops short of asserting that the members of Congress were necessarily acting consciously
in their own self-interest).
146
See supra notes 115-116 and accompany text.
147
Compare supra Part III.A.1 with supra Part III.A.2.
148
The 527 disclosure provisions presumably had negligible revenue affect. Congress
enacted the other tax provisions before JCT provided such revenue effect estimates, but
given that the total amount spent during 2004 on political activities was somewhere in the
single-digit billions, see infra note 161 and accompany text and supra note 96 and
accompanying text, as compared to double-digit trillion of taxable income reported to the
IRS in 2005 the latest year for which figures are available), see infra note 179 and
accompanying text, it is unlikely those other provisions have significant revenue effects.
149
See supra Part I.B.1.
150
See supra Part I.A.
151
This pre-existing division arguably biases the result when considering coordination
– why could we not consider a wholesale re-allocation of responsibilities between election
law and tax law? The answer is that the allocation of cost/subsidy rules to tax law is driven

36

The Much Maligned 527

[14-Aug-2006

of the tax laws against disclosure, in the interests of encouraging
compliance with the tax laws.152
This division of responsibility may also explain the stark differences in
the legislative processes for these two sets of political activity provisions.
The potential harm from disclosure requirements and, even more so, from
funding restrictions rises to a constitutional level and so attracts both greater
legislative scrutiny and more robust litigation challenges. The potential
harm from the tax provisions, at least until the introduction of the 527
disclosure rules, is limited to an increased cost of engaging in political
activity. While potentially critical to candidates and others seeking to be
involved in political activity, such an increased cost generally does not raise
constitutional concerns, as the courts have repeatedly found.153 It is
unclear, however, that even if the tax law became involved in imposing
disclosure requirements, as it has with 527s, or funding restrictions, as has
been proposed by including most 527s in an expended definition of political
committee based primarily on their tax classification, would immediately
cause the relevant tax provisions to see a level of visibility equal to that
faced by election law provisions. The history of the 527 disclosure rules
indicates that at least initially this would not be the case.
The fact that visibility and coordination appear to favor incorporating
restrictions and disclosure requirements into election law as opposed to tax
law is not necessarily conclusive, however. Visibility could be improved,
and coordination might be adequate if even a few members of the taxwriting committees had expertise in election law matters.154 It also could be
argued that the relative ease with which Congress passed the 527 disclosure
provisions suggests that the tax law route presents less opportunities for
capture, perhaps because the members of tax-writing committees are less
consciously self-interested in this area than the members of the committees
that consider election law provisions.155 It is therefore necessary to also
consider the relevant administrative agencies and the ultimate effectiveness
of each body of law.
in large part by the fundamental role of that body of law – to determine what is, and what is
not, subject to tax.
152
See James N. Benedict & Leslie A. Lupert, Federal Income Tax Returns: The
Tension Between Government Access and Confidentiality, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 940, 94352 (1979) (describing the reasons underlying the confidentiality of tax information,
including the current restrictions on disclosures within the government).
153
See supra note 141.
154
See Zelinsky, supra note 106, at 1185 (making this point).
155
It could be argued as well, however, that there is a difference in expertise across
members of Congress, particularly with respect to sensitivity to the constitutional issues of
free speech and free association, and as the tax-writing committees generally do not have to
consider such issues.
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B. Administrative Agencies
1. The Federal Election Commission
The Federal Election Commission, an independent agency that reports
directly to Congress, is responsible for administering and enforcing federal
election law.156 The Commission consists of six commissioners nominated
by the President and confirmed by the Senate for six-year terms, no more
than three of whom may be members of the same political party.157 All
Commission actions require four affirmative votes.158 Historically the
Commission has consisted of three Democratic and three Republican
members chosen through negotiations between the relevant party’s
congressional leadership and the President.159
The Commission is currently supported by a staff of slightly less than
400 full time employees and a total budget of slightly more than $54
million, allocated over all functions including administration, audit
(approximately 10 percent of staff), information technology, general
counsel (approximately 35 percent of staff) and reports analysis
(approximately 15 percent of staff).160 During the last presidential election
year approximately 10,000 candidate committees, political party
committees, PACs, and other organizations (e.g., organizations other than
political committees that made independent expenditures and/or
electioneering communications) filed reports with the FEC and reported
slightly more than $8 billion in receipts and approximately $8.5 billion in
expenditures.161
The FEC is responsible for providing guidance in the form of
regulations, Advisory Opinions and public education material.162
156

See 2 U.S.C. § 437c(b)(1) (2000).
Id. § 437c(a)(1).
158
Id. § 437c(c).
159
MUTCH, supra note 14, at 104-06 (detailing the power struggles between the
President and Congress over several appointments); see also BROOKS JACKSON, BROKEN
PROMISE: WHY THE FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION FAILED 10 (1990) (describing how
the commissioners, at least through 1990 when the book was published, were “political
cronies of party leaders” and employees of parties and PACs as opposed to prominent
academics, distinguished former judges or national leaders from nonpartisan groups).
160
FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION ANNUAL REPORT 2005, at 32-33 (available at
www.fec.gov/pages/anreport.shtm).
161
FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION ANNUAL REPORT 2004, at 79 (available at
www.fec.gov/pages/anreport.shtm). The difference between expenditures and receipts is
presumably the result of an organization receiving funds in one calendar year (e.g., 2003)
but not spending them until a later year (e.g., 2004).
162
See 2 U.S.C. §§ 437f (advisory opinions), 438(a)(2) (requiring publication of a
157
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Regulations are subject to the requirements imposed by the Administrative
Procedure Act, i.e., generally issuance in proposed form, opportunity for
public comment, then issuance in final form.163 Advisory opinions only
apply to the party requesting them and to persons in situations that are
materially indistinguishable from that which is the subject of the advisory
opinion.164 Requests for advisory opinions are made public but the FEC is
only required to allow 10 days for public comment before it issues a final
advisory opinion.165
The FEC’s enforcement efforts included having its Reports Analysis
Division review all reports, auditing all of the presidential campaign
committees and several dozen candidate campaign committees, and
obtaining nearly $2.5 million in civil penalties and fines from 392 closed
enforcement cases in 2005.166 Information about enforcement matters is
publicly available through in case files maintained in the FEC’s
Washington, DC office and increasingly online.167 Conciliation agreements
resolving enforcement actions are also public documents.168
Both the guidance and enforcement processes require approval from the
commissioners, and they cannot delegate that approval authority.169 For
guidance the commissioners must approve both proposed and final
regulations, as well as all Advisory Opinions.170 For enforcement the
commissioners are directly involved in essentially every step of the process,
including deciding whether an investigation is warranted, whether there is
probable cause to believe a violation has occurred after an investigation is
complete, and whether a negotiated settlement should be accepted.171
Candidates who object to FEC-approved regulations generally have
standing to challenge such regulations in court.172 Any person who believes
manual relating to preparing required reports), (8) (rules, regulations and forms).
163
See id. § 437d(a)(8) (subjecting FEC developed regulations to the Administrative
Procedure Act (chapter 5 of 5 U.S.C.)); 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000 & Supp. III 2003)
(establishing the general process for rulemaking, including publication of a notice of
proposed rule making and an opportunity for interested persons to comment).
164
2 U.S.C. § 437f(c)(1) (2000).
165
Id. § 437f(d).
166
FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION ANNUAL REPORT 2005, at 5 (available at
www.fec.gov/pages/anreport.shtml).
167
Id. at 15; see also http://www.fec.gov/em/em.shtml (containing a searchable
database of completed enforcement actions in pdf format, audit reports of Authorized,
Unauthorized, and Publicly Financed Committees, Enforcement Profile for the prior fiscal
year, and documents detailing enforcement processes).
168
2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(4)(B)(ii) (2000).
169
Id. § 437c(c).
170
Id. § 437d(a)(7), (8).
171
Id. § 437b(a)(2), (3), (4)(A)(i).
172
See Shays v. FEC, 414 F.3d 76, 83-95 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (concluding that Members
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a violation of the election laws has occurred has the right to file a complaint
with the FEC.173 A person who files a complaint with the FEC generally has
standing to sue the FEC if it dismisses that complaint or fails to act upon
within a certain amount of time.174
2. The Internal Revenue Service
The Department of the Treasury administers the federal tax laws, with
guidance, collection and enforcement handled primarily by the Internal
Revenue Service.175 A single Commissioner, the only IRS employee
appointed by the President, oversees the IRS.176 The Commissioner is
advised by the IRS Chief Counsel’s Office, a separate division within the
Treasury Department that also has only a single presidential appointee (the
Chief Counsel).177
The Chief Counsel reports to both the IRS
Commissioner and the General Counsel of the Treasury Department.178
For the federal government’s fiscal year ended September 30, 2005, the
IRS collected over $2.2 trillion in taxes, including $1.4 trillion in income
taxes based on 174 million returns.179 During the same year it had
approximately 94,000 employees and a budget of slightly over $10 billion,
of which slightly less than half was dedicated to enforcement efforts.180 No
break out of expenditures or budgeted amounts relating to the narrow issue
of political activity are available, but the IRS Tax-Exempt and Government
Entities Division that oversees all tax-exempt organizations, including
charities and 527s, dedicated 472 full-time equivalent staff to exempt
organization compliance in the government’s fiscal year 2005.181 Taxexempt organizations filed approximately 850,000 returns during calendar

of the U.S. House of Representatives seeking reelection had standing to challenge FEC
regulations implementing the 2002 changes to the election laws).
173
2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(1) (2000).
174
2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(8)(A) (2000); FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 19-26 (1998)
(applying this statutory provision in holding that filers of a complaint with the FEC had
standing to bring a petition challenging the FEC’s dismissal of that complaint).
175
See 26 U.S.C. §§ 7801(a)(1) (describing the role of the Secretary of the Treasury),
7802(c)(1)(A) (describing the role of the IRS) (2000).
176
See id. § 7803(a)(1)(A), (2).
177
See id. § 7803(b).
178
Id. § 7803(b)(2), (3).
179
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE 2005 DATA BOOK 1-2 (available at
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/05databk.pdf).
180
Id. at 51, 54 (employee figures include the Chief Counsel’s office). The proposed
fiscal year 2007 budget is approximately $10.5 billion. BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT: FISCAL YEAR 2007, at 236 (2006).
181
NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2005 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 295.
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year 2004, not including initial and periodic reports filed by 527s.182 The
total number of tax-exempt organizations, including houses of worship and
other church-related entities that have voluntarily chosen to file for IRS
recognition of their tax-exempt status, is almost 750,000 and these
organizations, not including houses of worship and church-related entities,
have total annual receipts and expenditures of over $1 trillion.183
The Treasury Department provides guidance in numerous forms,
including regulations, revenue rulings and procedures, private letter rulings
and technical advice memoranda, and public education materials.184 As
with the FEC, regulations are subject to the requirements imposed by the
Administrative Procedure Act.185 Revenue rulings and procedures are
generally issued only in final, not proposed, form.186 Private letter rulings
and technical advice memoranda are similar to FEC Advisory Opinions but
legally may be relied upon only by the taxpayer requesting them,187
although as a practical matter other taxpayers often do rely on them. Unlike
Advisory Opinions, however, private letter rulings and technical advice
memoranda, and background documents relating to them including the
request for a ruling, are only made public after all identifying information
for the taxpayer involved has been redacted.188
Given the vast number of filings received by the IRS, it is not surprising
that its enforcement is somewhat spotty. With respect to tax-exempt
organizations, the IRS audited less than 5,000 of the returns processed
during calendar year 2004 or less than 0.6 percent.189 All information about
audits, and about taxpayers and their returns generally, is confidential and
so may not be disclosed by the government to the public.190 The major
exception to this general rule is that applications for tax-exempt status and
returns filed by tax-exempt organizations are generally available to the

182

INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE 2005 DATA BOOK 32.
Statistics of Income Division, Internal Revenue Service, Charities and Other TaxExempt Organizations, 2002, SOI BULLETIN, Fall 2005, at 263, 270.
184
See 26 U.S.C. § 7805(a), (c) (2000).
185
See MICHAEL I. SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE ¶ 1.03 (revised 2d ed.
2002-2005).
186
See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, UNDERSTANDING IRS GUIDANCE – A BRIEF
PRIMER (2006), http://www.irs.gov/irs/article/0,,id=101102,00.html (describing revenue
rulings, revenue procedures, and other forms of IRS guidance).
187
See 26 U.S.C. § 6110(k)(3) (2000).
188
See 26 U.S.C. § 6110(a)-(c) (2000).
189
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE 2005 DATA BOOK 32. This compares to an audit rate
of approximately 0.93 percent for individual taxpayers and 1.24 percent for corporate
taxpayers. Id. at 19.
190
See 26 U.S.C. § 6103(a)-(b) (2000 & Supp. III 2003) (providing generally that tax
returns and tax return information are confidential).
183
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public, including filings by 527s.191 The IRS also issues a public
announcement when it revokes the tax-exempt status of an organization, as
well as making all denials or revocations of tax-exempt status available in
redacted form.192
The guidance process is handled by Treasury Department staff who
report to the Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, a presidential appointee,
and by IRS and IRS Chief Counsel employees.193 The enforcement process
is handled by IRS employees, with legal advice provided by the IRS Chief
Counsel’s office.194 While the IRS is regularly accused of using the audit
process for political purposes,195 recent investigations have not found any
such misuse.196 The IRS has a longstanding policy of shielding political
appointees from involvement in almost all specific taxpayer matters.197
Only directly affected taxpayers have standing to challenge Treasury
Department regulations or IRS enforcement actions, i.e., only taxpayers
who have had their tax bills increased (or claim of tax-exempt status
denied) as a result of application of the regulation or enforcement action at
issue. For example, a third party generally does not have standing to
challenge the IRS’ decision to grant tax-exempt status to a particular
organization.198 Similarly, while members of the public are free to file
complaints with the IRS, they do not have standing to go to court to force
IRS action on such complaints or even to know whether in fact there has
been any IRS action.

191

See 26 U.S.C. § 6104 (2000 & Supp. III 2003).
See Tax Analysts v. IRS, 350 F.3d 100 (2003) (holding that the IRS must disclose
denials or revocations of tax exemptions in redacted form).
193
See SALTMAN, supra note 185, at ¶ 1.01[2].
194
See SALTMAN, supra note 185, at ¶ 1.02[4][a].
195
See, e.g., STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 106TH CONG., REPORT OF
INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS RELATING TO INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE HANDLING
OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATION MATTERS 12-13 (Comm. Print 2000) (summarizing
allegations that the IRS was engaging in political targeted examinations of tax-exempt
organizations).
196
See, e.g., STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 195, at 6-11
(Comm. Print 2000) (finding in general no credible evidence of improper use of taxpayer
information or conduct of audits, including for political purposes); INSPECTOR GENERAL
FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION, REVIEW OF THE EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS FUNCTION PROCESS
FO REVIEWING ALLEGED POLITICAL CAMPAIGN INTERVENTION BY TAX EXEMPT
ORGANIZATIONS
1-2
(2005),
available
at
www.ustreas.gov/tigta/auditreports/2005reports/200510035fr.pdf (concluding that there
were no indications of inappropriate actions, including political influence, in the IRS’
process for reviewing alleged political campaign intervention by Code section 501(c)(3)
organizations and initiating associated examinations of these organizations).
197
STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 195, at 96.
198
Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 96 (1976).
192

42

The Much Maligned 527

[14-Aug-2006

3. Comparing the Agencies
The specialization of the FEC is both its strength and, at least as it is
currently structured, its weakness. With administering election law as its
sole function, the FEC necessarily has developed an expertise in the area of
political activity. It also is highly accountable for its administration of that
law, for it can neither point to another responsible party nor claim the press
of other priorities when confronted with criticism about the interpretation or
enforcement of election law. Its focus on enforcing the rules requiring the
disclosure and, with respect to contributions, restriction of political
activities also suggests that it is best suited to coordinate any future laws in
those areas to ensure both complete coverage and no unnecessary
duplication of reporting or contradictory rules. The results of the FEC
enforcement process are also publicly available and may be challenged in
court by the party who initially filed a complaint.199
The Treasury Department and the IRS in contrast have a mandate that
encompasses a much larger area than just political activities.200 Even the
Exempt Organizations division, which has jurisdiction over 527s and other
tax-exempt organizations engaged in political activities, has to pursue
numerous objectives unrelated to political activity.201 This limits the ability
of the IRS to gain expertise with respect to political activities and also limits
its accountability for regulating in this area since it can easily and
legitimately plead the press of other priorities. The IRS’ general focus on
channeling funds into the right tax channel, as opposed to causing the
disclosure of those flows of funds or imposing limitations on them, also
suggests that its only coordination strength would be with respect to the
taxation or lack thereof of political activity expenditures.
The FEC’s specialization, which generates such a favorable comparison
to the IRS with respect to expertise and accountability, also carries a
substantial weakness, however: the apparent capture of the FEC by a
significant portion of its regulated population, specifically incumbent
politicians.202 The FEC Commissioners, all of whom are political
199

See supra notes 167-168, 174.
See, e.g., OFFICE OF TAX POLICY AND INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, 2005-2006
PRIORITY GUIDANCE PLAN (2005), available at www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/20052006_guidance_priority_list.pdf (listing 254 guidance projects, of which only one related
to political activity).
201
See, e.g., TAX EXEMPT AND GOVERNMENT ENTITIES DIVISION, FY 2006 EXEMPT
ORGANIZATIONS
(EO)
IMPLEMENTING
GUIDELINES
(2005),
available
at
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/fy_2006_implementing_guidelines.pdf (describing the Exempt
Organizations division’s priorities for the upcoming fiscal year; out of approximately 15
enforcement initiatives, only two involve political activity).
202
E.g., JACKSON, supra note 159, at 1-2.
200
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appointees, not only have to approve all guidance but each significant stage
of every enforcement action.203 This structural constraint naturally leads to
the suspicion that both the guidance and enforcement processes will be
biased toward a lack of regulation by the interests of those who appointed
the Commissioners.204 This suspicion has been confirmed in part by the
recent success of court challenges to a series of FEC-approved regulations
interpreting the 2002 election law changes.205
The Treasury Department and the IRS in contrast have numerous
structural and practical constraints preventing such capture. The size of the
tax apparatus and the breadth of its mission makes it very difficult as
practical matter for the few political appointees or even those who directly
report to them to become personally involved in many guidance or
enforcement projects.206 With respect to enforcement, the IRS informal
procedures generally exclude political appointees from decision making.207
This insulation from political influences is only strengthened by the risk to
the reputation of the IRS as a neutral and fair tax collector if any
accusations of political bias were found to be true, as shown by the alacrity
with which the Commissioner has sought investigations to counter
accusations of such improper influence.208
203

See supra notes 169-171 and accompanying text.
See Todd Lochner & Bruce E. Cain, Equity and Efficacy in the Enforcement of
Campaign Finance Laws, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1891, 1895-96 (1999) (describing the
widespread belief among FEC critics that it has been captured by political players and so
was willfully complacent, although noting the difficulty of proving that this capture, as
opposed to a lack of resources or inherent flaws in election law, is the source of the FEC’s
ineffectiveness); Trevor Potter & Glen Shor, Lessons on Enforcement from McConnell v.
FEC, 3 ELECTION L.J. 325, 330-32 (2004) (citing the McConnell v. FEC decision as an
express and implicit indictment of the FEC’s performance in interpreting the election
laws).
205
Shays v. FEC, 337 F. Supp.2d 28, 130-31 (D.D.C. 2004) (remanding three-quarters
of approximately 19 challenged regulations back to the FEC for reconsideration because of
failure either to properly interpret the relevant statute or to comply with the Administrative
Procedure Act), aff’d, 414 F.3d 76 (D.C. Cir. 2005); see also Shays v. FEC, 424 F. Supp.2d
100 (D.D.C. 2006) (concluding that the FEC failed to present a reasoned explanation for its
failure to promulgate a general rule regarding when a 527 must register as a political
committee and remanding the matter to the FEC for further proceedings). A challenge to
the regulations adopted by the FEC relating to certain soft money solicitation rules and the
definitions of “coordinated communications” and “Federal election activity” is currently
pending in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Complaint, Shays v. FEC,
No.
06-CV-01247
(D.D.C.
July
11,
2006),
available
at
http://www.campaignlegalcenter.org/attachments/1610.pdf.
206
See supra notes 176-177, 179-180 and accompanying text.
207
See supra note 197.
208
See, e.g., INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION, supra note 196, at 1
(noting that received requests in November 2004 from both the IRS Commissioner and the
head of the IRS Tax-Exempt/Government Entities Division to evaluate the process the IRS
204
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These observations suggest that if the capture issue could be overcome
or at least sufficiently addressed, the FEC’s advantages with respect to
expertise, accountability and coordination make election law the better
vehicle for disclosure requirements and restrictions on political activity.
The extent of this capture problem will be addressed in the next section,
while the issue of whether it can be sufficiently addressed will be discussed
in Part IV.
C. Effectiveness
1. Enforcement
A comparison of the actual enforcement of each body of laws in the
hands of their implementing agencies reveals several striking contrasts
suggested by the differences between them. By almost every measure the
FEC has proportionately greater resources to dedicate to enforcement.
Making the assumption that no more than a third of the FEC’s staff, or
approximately 130 employees, are dedicated to enforcement,209 they only
have to be concerned with approximately 10,000 organizations and cash
flows of less than $10 billion annually.210 The IRS, by comparison, has
almost 500 employees dedicated to enforcement in its Exempt
Organizations division, or about four times the number at the FEC, but their
oversight encompasses both a number of organizations and a total annual
cash flow that is almost a hundred times greater.211
This difference is reflected in the enforcement coverage by the two
agencies. The FEC’s staff actual reviews, at least in a cursory fashion,
every form filed with the FEC and resolves several hundred enforcement
actions a year.212 The IRS makes no pretense that it reviews all of the
850,000 returns filed by tax-exempt organizations or even all of the periodic
used to review allegations of potential political activities by tax-exempt organizations in
2004).
209
See supra note 160 and accompanying text. The findings of a 1999 report on the
FEC indicate this percentage is a reasonable assumption. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS,
LLP, TECHNOLOGY AND PERFORMANCE AUDIT AND MANAGEMENT REVIEW OF THE
FEDERAL
ELECTION
COMMISSION
(1999),
at
ES-5,
available
at
http://www.gao.gov/special.pubs/fecrpt.pdf (finding that 31 percent of the FTC’s staff time
was dedicated to compliance).
210
See supra note 161 and accompanying text. This is not to say that the FEC has
more enforcement resources than it can use, simply that in comparison to the IRS its level
of resources is substantially greater. See, e.g., Scott E. Thomas & Jeffrey H. Bowman,
Obstacles to Effective Enforcement of the Federal Election Campaign Act, 52 ADMIN. L.
REV. 575, 579-83 (2000) (describing the FEC’s need for greater resources).
211
See supra notes 181, 183 and accompanying text.
212
See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
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or annual filings by 527s, and its audit coverage reaches less than one
percent of the returns filed.213
The FEC and the IRS also have substantially different reaction speeds.
While critics of the FEC complain that it can take a year or two for the FEC
to resolve a complaint of election law violations214 – a reasonable
complaint, given that this is an eternity in the fast-paced world of politics –
the IRS pace of enforcement is much slower. Since the IRS is used to
auditing returns filed months after the end of the year in which the activity
reported occurred and, if it determines tax is owed, can always impose
interest to compensate for any delays, it is used to conducting audits that do
not even start until one or more years after the activity at issue occurred.215
And audits can drag on for years, particularly when they are political
sensitive. For example, while the audit of the NAACP for alleged political
activity inconsistent with its status as a charity began remarkably promptly
– in October 2004 when the activity at issue occurred in July 2004 – the
audit is still pending more than two years after the alleged activity and
shows no signs of being resolved in the near future.216
But do these differences also translate into more effective enforcement?
Here the picture is mixed. Looking first at disclosure, it is generally agreed
that the FEC currently manages to obtain and disseminate in a timely and
readily accessible manner the information required to be disclosed by
election law.217 Ironically, the alleged focus of the FEC on trivial and
technical violations of the law,218 if true, probably means that disclosure
213

See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
Thomas & Bowman, supra note 210, at 589 (describing how the enforcement
process can cause even a fairly routine matter to take a year for the FEC to resolve); see
also Lochner & Cain, supra note 204, at 1915-16 (finding that the FEC resolved 70 percent
of randomly selected complaints filed in 1991 and 1993 within two years, although noting
that this figure is misleading both because it is the more complex disputes that undoubtedly
take longer and because even two years is a long-time in politics).
215
In evaluating the earned income tax program, Professor Alstott noted a similar
responsiveness issue in that the tax system’s annual accounting interval makes it
impossible for that system to respond quickly to a taxpayer’s changing financial
circumstances. Alstott, supra note 103, at 579-84.
216
See Fred Stokeld, Documents Show Republican Lawmakers Contacted IRS about
NAACP, 2006 TAX NOTES TODAY 97-3 (2006).
217
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 209, at ES-3 to ES-5, 3-5 to 3-6; FRANK J.
SORAUF, MONEY IN AMERICAN ELECTIONS 250-51 (1988); Testimony of Senator Russell
Feingold Before the Committee on Rules and Administration, United States Senate (July
14, 2004), 2004 WL 1590056; see also Testimony of Trevor Potter Before the Committee
on Rules and Administration, United States Senate (July 14, 2004) (acknowledging that
“[t]he FEC has always been known for its high-quality disclosure office,” but also asserting
that the FEC’s failure to penalize political committees for failing to register and file reports
undermines disclosure), 2004 WL 1590048.
218
See MUTCH, supra note 14, at 94 (summarizing such allegations); Lochner & Cain,
214

46

The Much Maligned 527

[14-Aug-2006

failures receive a disproportionate level of attention. The IRS record on
disclosure pales in comparison. The rapidly constructed IRS website for
filings by 527s is difficult to use and search, according to third parties.219
And 527s fail to make many required filings and, when they do file, often
make incomplete filings according the Treasury Inspector General for Tax
Administration.220
While the IRS has announced increased enforcement measures to
combat these problems,221 its success with other publicly available filings
raises concerns about the effectiveness of those measures. The annual
information returns filed by most tax-exempt organizations are also public
documents.222 Besides the returns for 527s, only the returns for charities are
only readily available on the Internet, however, and then only because a
private party secured funding and created an Internet site for posting these
returns.223 There is no indication that the returns for other types of taxexempt organizations (other than 527s) will be readily accessible in the near
future absent such private party intervention. Finally, the accuracy of these
supra note 204, at 1897 (concluding, based on an analysis of randomly selected
enforcement actions in 1991 and 1993, that the FEC spends “the bulk of its resources
pursuing relatively technical or trivial violations”). The FEC has recently sought to address
this concern by implement an abbreviate enforcement process for late or non-filed
disclosure reports. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION ANNUAL REPORT 2005, at 11-13
(available at www.fec.gov/pages/anreport.shtm) (describing the program).
219
See PUBLIC CITIZEN, OFF TO THE RACES: FIRST QUARTER REPORTS SHOW THAT 50
TOP “527” ORGANIZATIONS COLLECTED ALMOST $11 MILLION IN SOFT MONEY;
PROBLEMS
CONTINUE
4-6
(2002),
available
at
DISCLOSURE
http://www.citizen.org/documents/1stQ2002_527Report.pdf (noting problems with the
website); UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS:
DATA DISCLOSURE AND IRS’S OVERSIGHT OF ORGANIZATIONS SHOULD BE IMPROVED 8-14
(2002) (detailing concerns about difficulties with using the IRS website and flaws with
planned IRS efforts to address these concerns). There do not appear to have been any
reports since 2002, so the degree to which the IRS has addressed these initial problems is
unknown.
220
TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION, ADDITIONAL ACTIONS
ARE NEEDED TO ENSURE SECTION 527 POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS PUBLICLY DISCLOSE
THEIR ACTIVITIES TIMELY AND COMPLETELY 5-6 (2005), available at
www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2005reports/200510125fr.pdf (based on a statistically
valid sample of the 527 filings and without independently verifying any of the submitted
information, concluding that 7 percent of 527s failed to file a timely initial report, 13
percent failed to file one or more required periodic reports, and of those that did file the
required period reports 22 percent did not include all of the required information).
221
I.R.S. News Release IR 2004-110 (Aug. 19, 2004), available at
http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=128521,00.html; see also Notice 2002-34,
2002-1 C.B. 990 (to promote disclosure by 527s, announcing a voluntary compliance
program permitting 527s to file all required forms by July 15, 2002 without penalty).
222
See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
223
See www.guidestar.org (operated by the charity Philanthropic Research, Inc.).
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returns has been a long-standing criticism, particularly with respect to
information regarding political activity.224 This criticism is unlikely to be
addressed in the near future given the less than one percent audit rate for
such returns.225
The enforcement of funding and other restrictions presents a somewhat
different picture. Supporters and critics differ over whether the FEC
engages in effective enforcement of such restrictions.226 The main barrier
cited by critics being the enforcement structure that requires a majority of
the politically appointed commissioners to approve each significant step for
every enforcement action.227 Critics have alleged that these flaws have
allowed purported PACs to escape their filing obligations, permitted
political parties and candidates (as opposed to corporations and individual
contributors) to escape the imposition of fines and led to a reduction in new
enforcement cases.228 Statistics on the degree of enforcement or lack
thereof are difficult to obtain and interpret; anecdotal evidence indicates
224

See, e.g., THE CAMPAIGN FINANCE INSTITUTE, NONPROFIT INTEREST GROUPS’
ELECTION ACTIVITIES AND FEDERAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE POLICY 12-13 (2006) (noting that
of the non-527 tax-exempt organizations studied, some were failing to report some or all of
their political activity in part because of inadequate IRS oversight); Craig Holman, The
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act: Limits and Opportunities for Non-Profit Groups in
Federal Elections, 31 N. KY. L. REV. 243, 381-82 (2004) (noting the apparent paucity of
IRS enforcement actions and minimal penalties for tax-exempt organization reporting
failures).
225
See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
226
For the best articulation of the view that the FEC enforcement is, if anything, too
aggressive, see Bradley A. Smith & Stephen M. Hoersting, A Toothless Anaconda:
Innovation, Impotence and Overenforcement at the Federal Election Commission, 1
ELECTION L.J. 145 (2002).
227
See, e.g., Kenneth A. Gross, The Enforcement of Campaign Finance Rules: A
System in Search of Reform, 9 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 279, 286 (citing “party-line
deadlocks” as one barrier to the FEC investigating violations of the law) (1991); John
McCain, Reclaiming Our Democracy: The Way Forward, 3 ELECTION L. J. 115, 119 (2004)
(citing the majority vote requirement as making the FEC “structured to fail”). The FEC
also lacks a chief executive position, instead having a rotating “Chairman,” whose primary
duties are to preside over meetings and testify before Congress, and two staff members, the
general counsel and a staff director, who both report directly to commissioners and neither
of whom report to the other. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 437c (2000); MUTCH, supra note 14, at 103.
228
See, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 159, at 1 (asserting that the commissioners often
overrule FEC staff recommendations to investigate suspected infractions);
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 209, at 3-6 to 3-7 (citing the consensus of eight
interviewed legal practitioners that the enforcement process took a long time to resolve
alleged violations and noting that most of them believed that the then current FEC
enforcement did not create a strong deterrent effect); SORAUF, supra note 217, at 254-57
(noting general agreement, at least in 1988, that the FEC’s enforcement efforts were both
slow and timid, and attributing these flaws primarily to congressional efforts to keep its
enforcement efforts limited); Testimony of Trevor Potter Before the Committee on Rules
and Administration, United States Senate (July 14, 2004), 2004 WL 1590048 (F.D.C.H.).
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some recent increase in enforcement but how this compares to the actual
amount of violations is unclear.229
The IRS, in contrast, has relatively detailed statistics about its level of
general enforcement of the rules governing tax-exempt organizations as
reflected in audit rates. The problem is that audit rates for tax-exempt
organizations (and generally) are very low,230 either indicating a relatively
compliant regulated community or a relative lack of enforcement. The most
documented area relating to political activity is with respect to the
prohibition on charities engaging in political activity, but even there the
number of audits were few and most resulted in only an advisory even when
the IRS found a violation231 – again indicating either a generally lawabiding community or a lack of effective enforcement.
There are reasons to suspect that the latter is the larger part of the
explanation.232 The IRS has particular difficulty in enforcing the tax laws
229

E.g., Kenneth P. Doyle, Former MZM Employee Pleads Guilty to Making Illegal
Campaign Donations, 1 BNA WHITE COLLAR CRIME REP. 14 (Aug. 4, 2005), at d15; Press
Release, Federal Election Commission, Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
(“Freddie Mac”) Pays Largest Fine in FEC History (Apr. 18, 2006),
http://www.fec.gov/press/press2006/20060418mur.html (reporting that Freddie Mac had
agreed to pay a $3.8 million civil penalty to settle allegations it had violated various
election laws).
230
See supra note 189.
231
During the 2004 election year, the IRS initiated either examinations or, in the case
of churches and other houses of worship, inquiries of 132 organizations. See EXEMPT
ORGANIZATIONS, FINAL REPORT: PROJECT 302: POLITICAL ACTIVITIES COMPLIANCE
INITIATIVE
5
(2005)
(“FINAL
REPORT”),
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irstege/final_paci_report.pdf. This compares to the approximately 250,000 charities that filed
annual information returns in the year for 2002 (the latest year for which filing data is
available from the IRS); the IRS also estimates there are 500,000 additional charities that
are active but are not required to file such returns either because they are houses of worship
and church-related organizations or because they have a relatively low level of financial
activity. Statistics of Income Division, supra note 183, at 1 & n. 1. Of the 82 closed cases,
no political activity was found in 18 cases and 56 led to findings of minor or isolated
incidences of political activity. Of the remaining eight cases, five led to the filing of
corrected or delinquent returns and three to proposed revocation. FINAL REPORT, at 18-19;
EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS, 2004 POLITICAL ACTIVITY COMPLIANCE INITIATIVE (PACI):
SUMMARY OF RESULTS 1 (2006), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/one_page_statistics.pdf.
The organizations involved have appealed four of the closed cases within the IRS, which
likely include all three proposed revocations. See FINAL REPORT, at 18.
232
At least one watchdog organization has asserted that the IRS is exaggerating the
extent to which charities violate the Code section 501(c)(3) prohibition on political activity,
but that organization bases its criticism primarily on the fact that in less than 40 percent of
recent investigations of alleged violations has the IRS determined that an actual violation
occurred. OMB WATCH, THE IRS POLITICAL ACTIVITIES ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM FOR
CHARITIES AND RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS 1, 8-9 (2006), available at
http://www.ombwatch.org/pdfs/paci_full.pdf. But anecdotal information indicates that at
least minor violations may be relatively widespread even if not investigated by the IRS.
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when there is a lack of third-party reporting of a taxpayer’s activities.233
With respect to tax-exempt organizations, the IRS rarely challenges the taxexempt status of a charity because of political activity, and then usually
only in the most egregious cases.234 More questionable cases tend to
become bogged down in the enforcement process, with the IRS often sitting
on them for years – whether in the hope of wearing down the organization
involved or out of shear inertia it is unclear. And the most political
sensitive cases tend to be the ones that are the most delayed. For example,
the IRS did not rule on the Christian Coalition’s application for tax-exempt
status under Code section 501(c)(4) for nine years, then litigated the denial
of that status for another five years, and recently agreed to grant that status
subject to certain conditions.235 The FEC case against the Christian
Coalition, by comparison, was resolved in seven years from the date of the
first complaint until a court decision, although in the end a court found only
relatively minor violations of election law.236
2. Compliance Burden
Individuals and organizations that engage in political activities are
already used to being, at least potentially, subject to both election law and
tax law and so placing new rules in either body of law should at first glance
not result in significant compliance burden differences. But that first glance
is deceptive because it ignores the fact that until enactment of the 527
disclosure rules compliance with the tax law for 527s was very simple – a
See, e.g., John Fritze, Political Gifts by Churches Break IRS Rules: At Least 115 in
Maryland Have Donated Money to Candidates Since 2000, BALTIMORE SUN, Feb. 26,
2006, at 1A (based on a review of candidate finance reports, concluding that over six years
115 churches in Maryland had made contributions to candidates).
233
See UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, TAX GAP: MAKING
SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS IN IMPROVING TAX COMPLIANCE RESTS ON ENHANCING CURRENT
IRS TECHNIQUES AND ADOPTING NEW LEGISLATIVE ACTIONS 1-2. 6-7 (2006) (estimating
that the IRS will collect $290 billion less that the total amount of taxes owed, even after
enforcement efforts are completed, primarily because of underreporting of income; this
amount represents approximately 13.7% of all taxes owed).
234
See supra note 231.
235
See Complaint, Christian Coalition Int’l v. United States, No. 2:01-cv-377 (Feb. 25,
2000), reprinted in 2000 TAX NOTES TODAY 41-49; Gregory L. Colvin, IRS Gives
Christian Coalition a Green Light for New Voter Guides, 2005 TAX NOTES TODAY 207-29
(2005) (analyzing the successful revised application by the Christian Coalition
International for recognition of exemption); Fred Stokeld, IRS Grants Exempt Status to
Christian Coalition International, 2005 TAX NOTES TODAY 207-6 (2005) (reporting that
the IRS granted tax-exempt status to the Christian Coalition International based on its
“revised operations”).
236
FEC v. Christian Coalition, 52 F. Supp.2d 45 (D.D.C. 1999). Neither side appealed
the decision.
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single one-page filing requirement, and then only if the 527 had noncontribution income in excess of $100.237 All of the complex issues for
527s involved the election law and dealing with the FEC. The creation of
overlap between election law and tax law through the 527 disclosure rules
increased the administrative burdens of 527s by sharply increasing their
responsibilities under the tax law and so their potential interactions with the
IRS as well as the FEC. It is difficult to measure the extra cost associated
with having to deal on a more regular basis with two agencies as opposed to
a single one, but it certainly comes with some costs.
This shift to dual authority over may also increase compliance burdens
by forcing 527s to deal much more extensively with an agency – the IRS –
with which they have not had an opportunity to develop informal norms and
informal procedures for interaction. This lack of such informal mechanisms
may also decrease the effectiveness of enforcement, as the IRS seeks to
learn how to deal more extensively with a new set of organizations.238
3. Regulatory Arbitrage Opportunities
Regulatory arbitrage generally exists when an entity can choose under
which of two or more regulatory structures it will operate, thereby giving
the entity the opportunity to choose the structure with the lowest regulatory
burdens.239 But it can also exist when different types of entities can engage
in the same activity but be subject to different regulatory structures.240 In
that situation, the decision is whether the cost, if any, of operating through a
particular type of entity justifies the lower regulatory burden achieved.
An example of such regulatory arbitrage can be seen in the concerns that
gave rise to the 527 disclosure rules. Congress had apparently assumed that
527s did not need to be subject to any tax law disclosure rules because they
were already covered by federal and state election law disclosure rules.241
237

See supra note 83.
See Lochner & Cain, supra note 204, at 1900-01 (describing how an effective
enforcement strategy requires the fostering of long-term relationships with regulatees who
are repeat players in order to establish such informal mechanisms).
239
This concept tends to be used primarily in the context of regulating business
transactions. See, e.g., Rob Frieden, Regulatory Arbitrage Strategies and Tactics in
Telecommunications, 5 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 227 (2004); Amir N. Licht, Regulatory
Arbitrage for Real: International Securities Regulation in a World of Interacting Securities
Markets, 38 VA. J. INT’L L. 563 (1998); Frank Partnoy, Financial Derivaties and the Costs
of Regulatory Arbitrage, 22 J. CORP. L. 211 (1997).
240
See, e.g., William J. Carney, The Costs of Being Public After Sarbanes-Oxley: The
Irony of “Going Private,” 55 EMORY L.J. 141 (2006) (discussing the increasing regulatory
burdens on public companies that therefore encourage businesses to shift to a private
company form despite the costs of doing so).
241
See supra note 87.
238

14-Aug-2006]

The Much Maligned 527

51

Political operatives eventually discovered, however, that this assumption
was not true: if they were willing to curtail their actions in certain ways in
order to avoid activities clearly subject to election law (i.e., campaign
contributions and express advocacy) they could create 527s that were not
subject to election law disclosure requirements.242 The activities of these
so-called “stealth PACs” were in many ways identical to the activities of
PACs and indeed of political party committees and candidates, but by
paying the cost of avoiding certain activities they could avoid both election
disclosure rules and restrictions.
Do the current and proposed rules relating to 527s create similar
opportunities for regulatory arbitrage? They do in one very significant way.
By targeting an organization type, instead of an activity type, the existing
disclosure rules and the proposed rules for imposing restrictions on 527s
only reach 527s. The exact same activities as that conducted by 527s –
political activity as broadly defined for tax purposes – can be conducted by
other types of organizations, creating an arbitrage opportunity.243 This
choice comes at a significant cost, however, for other types of tax-exempt
organizations: a non-527 must engage in, and obtain sufficient funding for,
non-political activity at a scale sufficient to make it the organization’s
primary purpose.244 There is also the risk of the gift tax applying to large
donors, although both the annual exemption (currently $12,000)245 and the
uncertainty of both the gift tax’s application and enforcement246 reduce this
risk to some degree. The continued high level of funding for 527s247
indicates that these costs are generally too high to pay in order to avoid the
disclosure rules.248 This conclusion is necessarily tentative, however, since
242

See supra note 81.
See supra notes 59, 74 and accompanying text. Tax law therefore provides a
taxpayer with the ability to choose between a varieties of organizational structures through
which to engage in political activity, with Congress not having a strong preference between
the choices since all of them lead to the same tax result: use of after-tax dollars to pay for
political activity.
244
See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
245
26 U.S.C. § 2503(b) (2000 & Supp. III 2003).
246
See supra note 71-72 and accompanying text.
247
See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
248
But see THE CAMPAIGN FINANCE INSTITUTE, supra note 224, at17-21 (detailing how
certain well-funded and prominent organizations have chosen not to use 527s but to instead
direct their political activity that is not subject to election law through other types of taxexempt organizations). The ability of at least well-advised and well-funded entities to
change their tax classification is not new. See, e.g., Karen Gullo (of the Associated Press),
IRS Rules Will Let Donors to “Civic” Groups Stay Secret, DENVER POST, Oct. 24, 1997, at
A32 (reporting that two groups that spent $3 million in 1996 to support or oppose
candidates shifted from 501(c)(4) to 527 status in the face of congressional and public
scrutiny).
243
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it is unclear to what extent political activity has shifted to non-charitable
tax-exempt organizations other than 527s and whether that shift will
increase over time.249
The benefits from shifting activities from a 527 to another type of noncharitable tax-exempt organization would be significantly increased,
however, if the pending proposals to require all 527s to submit to the PAC
restrictions on contributions became law. What may currently be a
trickle250 of funds moving from 527s to these other tax-exempt organization
could well become a torrent – if for no other reason than the donors who
want to contribute large amounts of funds to support political activity will
have no where else to go.251 The vague definition of political activity for
tax purposes also reduces the cost of such a shift. While some activities
may be unquestionably political activity,252 others could perhaps be
recharacterized as completely nonpartisan. For example, it may be possible
for many current 527 activities, such as voter registration drives that are
nonpartisan on their face but are political because they are geographically
targeted to areas with close races, to be recharacterized as completely
nonpartisan by carefully selecting criteria other than the competitiveness of
a particular race as the basis for geographic targeting.
249

See THE CAMPAIGN FINANCE INSTITUTE, supra note 224, at 3, 32-33 (2006)
(describing how many organizations engaged in political activity create a constellation of
entities to pursue such activity, often including 527s and non-charitable tax-exempt
organizations, and noting the potential such entities to shift political activities from the
former to the latter if faced with additional regulation of 527s); PUBLIC CITIZEN, THE NEW
STEALTH PACS: TRACKING 501(C) NON-PROFIT GROUPS ACTIVE IN ELECTIONS (2004)
(concluding that non-charitable tax-exempt organizations other than 527s spend at least
tens of millions of dollars on political activity each federal election year).
250
And even the current movement may be more than a trickle. See PUBLIC CITIZEN,
supra note 249 (documenting the tens of millions spent by non-charitable tax-exempt
organizations on political activity in each federal election year). The lower level of
confirmed and estimated 527 funding in 2006 may also indicate that funds have moved
elsewhere, although the fact that these figures are preliminary and 2006 is a nonpresidential federal election year make it difficult to be sure that this is the case. See Press
Release, Campaign Finance Institute, 527 Group Fundraising Grew More Slowly in First
Quarter of 2006 than 2004 (May 19, 2006), http://www.cfinst.org/pr/051906.html.
251
See Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance
Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705 (1999) (describing the hydraulic nature of political money,
in that it has to go somewhere and it is part of a broader ecosystem). One response to this
concern is that perhaps the re-direction will be in a favored direction, but given the
essentially equal independence of both 527s (other than political committees) and other
types of tax-exempt organizations it seems unlikely that the likely shift here would be
particularly favored. See Daniel R. Ortiz, Commentary, Water, Water Everywhere, 77
TEX. L. REV. 1739, 1743-44 (1999) (noting this point in the context of a shift from groups
controlled by candidates to those that are not, but remaining neutral as to which set of
organizations it would be better to direct the funds).
252
See, e.g., supra note 38 (Bill Yellowtail ad).
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There is also no tax rule that prevents a taxable organization from
engaging in political activity.253 There is greater uncertainty and therefore
greater potential cost for such an organization than even non-527 taxexempt organizations, as taxable organization would be exposed not only to
the gift tax issue but also to whether contributions are taxable income. But
there may be one significant advantage to using a taxable entity: it is not
clear that an otherwise taxable organization that engages in political activity
as its primary activity would be or could be forced under Code section
527.254 In rejecting a challenge to the new disclosure rules, the Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit stated that an organization could avoid the
disclosure rules simply by choosing not claim tax-exempt status under
section 527.255 This leads to a perverse and ironic result: the use of tax
categories in order to eliminate “stealth” 527s could lead to the creation of a
new category of “stealth” taxable entities. Regulation of such entities
through the tax law would be complicated by both the established secrecy
of information provided to the IRS by such organizations256 and the lack of
a tax-exempt hook to overcome constitutional concerns.257
4. Conclusion
The difference in enforcement results and the potential for regulatory
253

For example, Triad Management Services and Triad Management Services, Inc.
were both taxable entities that the courts ultimately determined should have been registered
as political committees and also violated a host of other election laws. Final Judgment and
Order Granting Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, FEC v. Malenick, No. 02-CV-01237
(D.D.C. July 26, 2005). Despite the fact that the FEC’s legal battles with these entities and
their founder, Carolyn Malenick, lasted nine years, there is no indication that at any point
did the IRS assert that these entities should have been classified as 527s. See, e.g., John
Bresnahan, After Long Fight, Triad Files FEC Report, ROLL CALL, Nov. 1, 2005 (detailing
the outcome of that battle without any mention of IRS involvement). Whether the IRS will
be more likely to make such assertions given the new 527 disclosure rules is unclear.
254
Such an entity might be required to register as a PAC, thereby losing any advantage
its taxable status might gain, but it is far from clear how effective the FEC would be in
enforcing such a requirement. See Bresnahan, supra note 253 (summarizing the nine year
legal battle that it took to force Triad Management Services to register and file disclosure
reports as a political committee, but noting that the reports failed to disclosure the identities
of donors and that the only penalty ultimately imposed was a $50,000 civil fine). The FEC
recently sued the Club for Growth Inc. for failure to register as a political committee, but
that suit is still pending. See Complaint, FEC v. Club for Growth, Inc., No. 05-CV-01851
(Sept.
19,
2005),
available
at
http://www.fec.gov/law/litigation/club_for_growth_complaint.pdf.
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Mobile Republican Assembly v. United States, 353 F.3d 1357, 1361-62 (11th Cir.
2003).
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See supra note 190.
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See supra note 141.
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arbitrage suggest two conclusions. First, it appears that the FEC is better
suited to administer a disclosure regime and that the use of a tax category –
Code section 527 – to trigger the application of that regime generates
limited regulatory arbitrage opportunities because the cost of disclosure is
relatively small compared to the cost of shifting political activities into
another type of entity. Second, both the FEC and IRS are not very effective
at enforcement of non-disclosure provisions (restrictions on contributions
for the FEC, placement in the correct tax category based on political activity
for the IRS) but for different reasons – the FEC is subject to an
administrative structure that inhibits such enforcement while the IRS lacks
sufficient resources to engage in such enforcement, particularly given the
tax law’s vague definition of political activity. This suggests that a
restrictions regime that requires both effective FEC enforcement and
effective IRS enforcement to succeed has two significant hurdles to
overcome. Its ability to succeed is also complicated by the arbitrage
opportunity presented by the fact that tax law permits political activity to be
conducted by numerous types of entities, not just 527s, creating
opportunities to shift activities to a lower-regulated entity, although there
are costs to doing so.
IV. SPECIFIC PROPOSALS
These observations and conclusions suggest certain specific proposals
both with respect to current law and recent proposals to change current law.
These proposals including shifting responsibility for the 527 disclosure
rules to the FEC, not imposing existing political committee contribution
restrictions based on the 527 tax classification, and changing the structure
of the FEC to reduce its capture and therefore, hopefully, enhance its
effectiveness.
A. Shift Responsibility for 527 Disclosure to the FEC
The FEC’s three decades of expertise in obtaining accurate disclosure
reports for political committee and promptly making those reports easily
accessible to the public, its greater visibility and therefore accountability for
regulating political activity generally, and its ability to coordinate the
political committee and 527 disclosure regimes argue strongly for shifting
responsibility for the 527 disclosure regime to the FEC. The FEC’s greater
enforcement resources, developed in part specifically to address such
disclosures, and relatively effective enforcement of the existing political
committee disclosure regime also support this shift. The places where the
FEC is weakest – the extent of its capture by incumbent politicians and
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subsequent ineffective enforcement, particularly with respect to restrictions
– are of lesser concern when it comes to disclosure. At the same, it appears
that the relatively low cost of disclosure for most political actors is
insufficient to justify the cost of attempting to move out of the 527
category, at least based on the still extensive activities of 527s in 2004, even
given the opportunities for such shifts created by both the vague tax law
definition for political activity and the relatively ineffective IRS
enforcement of tax classifications based on political activity.258
One criticism of this proposal is that it does not go far enough to fix the
problems with the 527 disclosure rules. Those problems include the
thresholds for disclosure of contribution and expenditure information being
unnecessarily low given that such detailed information is not needed to help
enforce restrictions on contributions as those do not (yet, at least) apply to
527s that are not political committees.
They are also arguably
unnecessarily low because they apply even to 527s that may engage in
federal-election related activity only as a small part of their activities or may
only engage in activities that are nonpartisan on their face although the
intent is to influence the election of one or more candidates.
The first criticism has some merit and in a perfect world the threshold
might be significantly higher, as, for example, is the case for contributions
for electioneering communications, that have a $1,000 threshold instead of
the $200 threshold applicable to 527s. The additional administrative burden
from the lower thresholds does not appear to be significant, however.259
The second point ignores the fact that the public has a relatively strong
interest in knowing who is supporting or opposing particular candidates,
whether federal, state or local and whether obviously or more subtly.260
B. Do Not Impose Contribution Restrictions on 527s
The recent proposals to impose political committee contribution
restrictions on 527s (by redefining “political committee” so that it
encompasses most 527s) present more significant problems, however.
Proponents of this change are right to seek it through legislation – as
258

The differences in the legislative process between election law and tax law tends to
support this conclusion, although they are less important here because the disclosure
regime is already in place. The shifting of the disclosure responsibility to the FEC would
place it within the more visible election law regime, and under the oversight of members of
Congress who may be more expert than the members of the tax-writing committees in
balancing the free speech and free association concerns raised by such disclosure and
coordinating all of the provisions requiring disclosure and restriction of political activity.
See supra Part III.A.3.
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opposed to regulatory change, although they are pursuing that route as well
– to ensure that this sharp limitation on contributions is done only after
highly visible consideration of the trade-offs involved.261 But they are
wrong in assuming that this combination of FEC-enforced instructions
imposed on entities subject to an IRS-enforced classification can be
effective.
The FEC has the expertise, accountability, and ability to coordinate with
the existing restrictions on all political committees to implement such
restrictions, although here the capture problem and resulting lack of
effective enforcement are at their highest level and so would have to be
addressed (see the next proposal). The problem is that the restrictions
would apply based on a tax classification even though the IRS has limited
accountability for ensuring that entities engaged in political activity are in
fact are placed in the right tax category, no demonstrated ability to
coordinate with the FEC on matters relating to political activities, and
enforcement efforts that are hampered by both a vague definition of
political activity and limited resources for such enforcement. This problem
is aggravated by the fact that exactly the same kind of activity can be
conducted in other types of tax entities, specifically other types of noncharitable tax-exempt organizations and taxable entities. Although there is
a significant but hard to quantify cost of using a different type of entity – at
least in part intentionally so, as Congress wanted to encourage tax-exempt
organizations to concentrate their political activities in 527s to lower
compliance and enforcement burdens262 – there are strong reasons to believe
the cost would be worth paying for many of the donors who would find
themselves with no where else to give their funds to support political
activity of their choosing.263 One ironic effect of such a shift would be the
best-funded groups, which presumably would often be the groups with the
largest donors, would be most able to bear the costs of the shift and so
would gain an advantage over their lesser funded competitors.264
One response to this proposal would be to urge instead that the FEC and
the IRS work together the oversee 527s, perhaps with the FEC even lending
261

Seeking such a change through regulations as opposed to legislation also raises
administrative law concerns. Allison R. Hayward & Bradley A. Smith, Don’t Shoot the
Messenger: The FEC, 527 Groups, and the Scope of Administrative Authority, 4 ELECTION
L.J. 42 (2005); Polsky & Charles, supra note 8, at 1016-27.
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See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
263
See supra note 96 (describing the main sources of funds for 527s)
264
See, e.g., Posting of Brad Smith to http://www.campaignfreedom.org/blog/ (July
24, 2006) (criticizing a recent Campaign Finance Institute report regarding the use of
multiple entities with varying tax classifications to pursue a common political agenda, see
supra note 224, because it focused on the largest such organizations and therefore the ones
most able to bear the cost of any additional regulation).
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some of its more abundant enforcement resources to support policing the
527 line (again, assuming the capture problem and its effects can be
resolved). The problem with such joint administration, however, is that
generally it does not work.265 There are no compelling reasons to believe
there would be greater success here. Joint administration might even
undermine the strengths that each agency brings to the table. The otherwise
politically insulated decisions by the IRS would become subject to
politically influenced FEC input; the FEC’s accountability would be
reduced because it could blame the IRS, with its much larger range of
responsibilities and priorities, for any delays in producing guidance or
engaging in enforcement.
C. Restructure the FEC to Reduce Capture
Even if Congress makes no further changes in law with respect to 527s,
there is still the problem of the FEC’s apparent capture by incumbent
politicians and resulting ineffective enforcement, particularly for
contribution restrictions. Here, however, the IRS can provide some help not
as a co-enforcer but as a model. To protect the misuse of the tax laws for
political purposes Congress and the IRS have taken several steps, including
limiting the number of political appointees in the IRS to one person (or two,
counting the Chief Counsel), granting final decision authority to that single
appointee (the Chief Counsel serves in an advisory capacity), and
intentionally shielding that one appointee from involvement in particular
enforcement actions.266
Existing proposals to change the FEC’s structure to combat capture
incorporate a number of these elements plus several others.267 Common
proposals include creating a strong Chair with authority to make some of
the decisions now assigned to the full commission,268 reducing the
265

See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 176-177, 196-197. When it comes to guidance the Assistant
Secretary for Tax Policy, a political appointee, is also involved, although much of the work
is done by professionals in the Assistant Secretary’s office.
267
See Federal Election Administration Act of 2006, H.R. 5676, 109th Cong. (2006)
(“FEA Act”); BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS: A NEW
PARADIGM FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE 10, 128-39 (2002).
268
FEA Act, supra note 267, § 101 (inter alia, amending FECA § 361 to grant the
Chair of the new Federal Election Administration new powers); JACKSON, supra note 159,
at 63-64; John McCain, Reclaiming Our Democracy: The Way Forward, 3 ELECTION L.J.
115, 119-20 (2004); see also PROJECT FEC, NO BARK, NO BITE, NO POINT: THE CASE FOR
CLOSING THE FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION AND ESTABLISHING A NEW SYSTEM FOR
ENFORCING THE NATION’S CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS 2 (2002) (proposing the creation of
new election-law agency with a single administrator); Verkuil, supra note 122, at 275-78
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threshold vote required for at least the initial determination that the FEC
should begin an investigation from four to three votes,269 and changing to an
odd number of commissioners to prevent deadlocks (although it is unclear
how partisan balance could be maintained with such a change).270 It is true
that some commentators have argued any such changes will at best produce
marginal changes and at worst actually create less effective enforcement,
and so a better solution is to remove the restrictions in their entirety while
emphasizing disclosure.271 But assuming, as this Article does, some level
of restrictions as well as disclosure requirements, even changes that will
result in potentially marginal improvements should be considered.272
CONCLUSION
Election law and tax law are different; the FEC and the IRS are
different. These facts are obvious but they have to date played little if any
role in discussions regarding 527s and the imposition on these tax-created
entities of what have historically been election-law rules. This Article has
attempted to explore those differences and through doing so provide a
reasoned basis for choosing which body of law and which agency is best
suited for considering and pursuing regulation of political activity. The
result of this approach has led to some proposals regarding the direction that
future change in this area should take.
This approach has also required the development of a new framework
for making this choice when considering a regulatory, as opposed to
economic, policy goal. The insights of this framework therefore not only
have ramifications for the important but relatively narrow question of how
to choose the best substantive body of law to use for regulating political
activity but also ramifications for any attempt to use the tax law, as opposed
to another substantive body of law, to regulate a set of activities. One area
where this framework may have immediate application is the increasing use
of the tax law to not only determine the tax status of nonprofit organizations
and of contributions to them, but to require such organizations to disclosure
their finances and activities and to place pressure on such organizations to

having a single administrator but who, in deference to congressional concerns, could be
removed for cause by Congress).
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Thomas & Bowman, supra note 210, at 592-93.
270
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Federal Election Administration with three members); JACKSON, supra note 159, at 64-65;
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272
It is beyond the scope of this Article to shift through the various FEC
reform/replacement proposals and develop the optimal list of changes.
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adopt certain good governance processes and procedures.273 Another
possible application is the proposed use of the tax law to increase the
financial transparency of public corporations by requiring them to
disclosure their federal tax returns.274 Other applications may also exist,
including making choices that do not involve tax law. Such applications are
beyond the scope of this modest Article, but hopefully this Article has
advanced the ability to analyze and make such choices.
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See, e.g., PANEL ON THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, STRENGTHENING TRANSPARENCY
GOVERNANCE ACCOUNTABILITY OF CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS (2005) (making various
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